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DERRICK BELL'S NARRATIVES AS PARABLES
GEORGE H. TAYLOR*

What does the literary character of Derrick Bell's fictional narratives tell us
about how they should be interpreted? In his chronicle, The Space Traders,' for
instance, Bell relates the tale of alien visitors to the United States who promise
the country wealth if it will trade the nation's blacks. 2 The country votes
decisively for the trade. 3 In The Racial PreferenceLicensing Act,4 Bell recounts
the decision by a fictional President to permit employers and property owners to
buy a license that would allow them to discriminate on the basis of color and
race. 5 License fees would be used to support businesses, homeowners, and
students in the black community. 6 What are these stories trying to tell us? How
are they trying to move us? Should they be read literally, as though the country
would indeed vote in favor of the aliens' trade? Would the establishment of a
racial preferencing license, in fact, more efficaciously resolve racial unrest?
What does the status of these stories as "fictions" indicate about their claims, if
any, to truth? How do they move readers to open themselves to the racial change
these narratives seek?
Questions of this kind have arisen in the context of a larger debate about the
employment of narrative in law and legal scholarship. Two principal charges
against narrative-in both fictional and nonfictional accounts-have appeared.
The first charge is that "stories can distort legal debate, particularly if those
stories are atypical, inaccurate, or incomplete." 7 Stories must be evaluated, the
claim goes, based on objective standards of knowledge and reason. 8 The second
charge is that legal narratives, even if true, are inadequate. They fail sufficiently
to persuade; thus, more material forms of racial change must be pressed. 9
. Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. My great thanks to Derrick Bell and Richard
Delgado for their comments on an earlier draft of this Article.
1. DERRICK BELL, FACES AT THE Bo'roM OF THE WELL: THE PERMANENCE OF RACISM 158-94
(1992) [hereinafter BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM], For further discussion of this narrative, see
infra Part III.B.
2. Id. at 159-60.
3. See id. at 192.
4. Id. at 47-64. For further discussion of this narrative, see infra Part III.A.
5. See id. at 47-48.
6. See id. at 48-49.
7. DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT ON

TRUTH INAMERICAN LAW 39 (1997) [hereinafter FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON].
8. See, e.g., id. at 5-7.
9. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Crossroadsand Blind Alleys: A CriticalExamination of Recent
Writing About Race, 82 TEX. L. REv. 121, 135-36, 152-53 (2003) [hereinafter Delgado,
Crossroads]. In the Crossroads essay, Delgado reviews DERRICK BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION:

LIVING A LIFE OF MEANING AND WORTH (2002) [hereinafter BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION] and
(Francisco Valdes, Jerome
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This article seeks to transcend the existing debate. I argue that the valuable
function of legal narratives can be understood only when we appreciate their
literary character. In particular, I contend that narratives such as Bell's should
be read as parables. I analogize the literary nature of Bell's narratives to the use
of parable in the Christian Bible's New Testament,1 0 a subject that has received
significant attention from New Testament scholars. The point is not to equate
the status of Bell's work with that of the New Testament parable, but to highlight
the similarities in literary style. 1' New Testament parables and Bell's parables

McCristal Culp & Angela P. Harris eds., 2002). The current Article does not address the latter
book.
10. Because of the contentiousness of contemporary debate on religious issues, let me offer
three caveats regarding my recourse to New Testament parable. First, I set aside any question,
whether favorable or antagonistic, of the New Testament's truth. My goal is to examine the
literary character of the parable. Parables can be religious or nonreligious-witness Bell's
work-but it happens that the literary nature of parables has been studied most intensely by New
Testament scholars. Therefore, this scholarship on parables needs attention. My literary inquiry
then seeks to proceed, like many other academic investigations, without assessing the truth of the
subject of inquiry. For those who remain suspicious that the portrait will remain favorable to
religion or, conversely, for those who remain hopeful that it will, let me suggest that attention to
the literary character of parable as manifestation raises challenging theological questions about
claims regarding the role of divine grace in Jesus's parables. For a brief discussion of this point,
see infra note 127.
Second, invocation of New Testament scholarship is not intended to disparage insight from
other religious traditions. For example, recent study of New Testament parables has located them
as not divided from but "regularly tied inseparably" to the larger context of contemporaneous
Jewish parable literature. See, e.g., Craig L. Blomberg, The ParablesofJesus: Current Trends and
Needs in Research, in STUDYING THE HISTORICAL JESUS: EVALUATIONS OF THE STATE OF CURRENT
RESEARCH 231, 234 (Bruce Chilton & Craig A. Evans eds., 1994) (citing the work of Claus
Westermann). Further, interpretation of the Hebrew Bible (what Christians call the Old
Testament) by Jewish scholars has also attempted to recover more broadly the modality of
manifestation, the theme I pursue in the more restricted context of New Testament parable

scholarship. See, e.g.,
KUGEL, GREAT POEMS]

L. KUGEL, THE GREAT POEMS OF THE BIBLE 35-36 (1999) [hereinafter
(suggesting that our "ways of seeing" have evolved over time).

JAMES

Third, my reliance on New Testament scholarship is not intended as a rejoinder on the side of
Christianity to criticism by Farber and Sherry that "radical multiculturalists," including Bell, are
anti-Semitic. See, e.g., FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7, at 4, 25-26, 58-59
(criticizing Bell). See generally id. at 52-71 (chapter entitled Is the Critique of Merit AntiSemitic?). (I set aside the question whether Bell is, in fact, a radical multiculturalist, which I think
he is not.) As already mentioned, my invocation of the New Testament parable is for literary
purposes, and Farber and Sherry's charge that radical multiculturalism is anti-Semitic is rejected
by other scholars, including those otherwise sympathetic to these authors. See Richard A. Posner,
The Skin Trade, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40, 42 (review of FARBER & SHERRY,
BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7) ("I do not think that the critical race theorists are antiSemites.").
11. Because this Article is concerned with a descriptive characterization of how parable is
employed both in Bell and the New Testament, it is not concerned with arguing whether in fact
Bell's stories or the New Testament's reveal "truth." See also supra note 10. Further, analogizing
the literary character of the parable in the New Testament to the parable's use in Bell's work
remains a literary inquiry, not a surreptitious effort to divinize Bell or his message. Rather, the
contention is that only by understanding the literary nature of the message can the reader be in the
position to raise the question of truth.
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both reorient, and they do so by disorienting. 12 Just as the New Testament
parables should be read based on the criteria of manifestation-the manifestation
of new knowledge and insight-rather than on the basis of adequation-to
existing norms and knowledgel 3-so, I argue, should Bell's narratives.
Part I presents the recent debate on legal narrative. Part 1I analyzes recent
New Testament scholarship on the parables and describes how the parables are
understood as vehicles of manifestation. Significantly, I differentiate the definition of a parable from that of an allegory. Part III demonstrates how Bell's
narratives are properly understood as parables. Bell's narratives should be comprehended as manifesting something new, something not appropriately assessed
on the basis of their message's adequation to customary norms or understandings. Part IV develops the larger insights of parable scholarship for
narrative legal theory in general. Part V concludes by justifying the article's defense of narrative within the debate over whether an argument for racial change
needs to promote a more material and less idealistic-in other words, less
narrative-oriented-basis for change.
I.
THE DEBATE ON LEGAL NARRATIVE

Narratives can operate in a number of ways, 14 but particularly I want to
elicit the function of disorientation that is explored in general narrative analysis.
Kathryn Abrams and Richard Delgado, two of the most prominent scholars of
legal narrative, describe variously how narratives can act as "paradigmshifting;"' 15 as rupturing1 6 and "revelatory;"' 17 as jarring, displacing, or destroying; 18 as "shatter[ing] complacency and challeng[ing] the status quo." 19 In
12. See infra text accompanying notes 112-17 (claiming that parables reorient by
disorienting).
13. See infra text accompanying notes 1 18-21 (contrasting the criteria of manifestation and
adequation).
14. See, e.g., Toni M. Massaro, Empathy, Legal Storytelling, and the Rule of Law: New
Words, Old Wounds?, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2099, 2104 (1989) (characterizing how legal narrative
symposium participants "describe or use multiple sorts of stories: stories that bridge, providing
connections between people of different experience, stories that explode (like grenades) certain
ways of thinking, stories that mask, devalue, or suppress other stories, stories that consolidate,
validate, heal, and fortify (like therapy), and even stories that maim or 'spirit murder' and so
should not be told at all") (footnotes omitted).
15. Kathryn Abrams, The Narrative and the Normative in Legal Scholarship, in
REPRESENTING WOMEN: LAW, LITERATURE AND FEMINISM 44, 50 (Susan Sage Heinzelman &
Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman eds., 1994) [hereinafter Abrams, The Narrative and the Normative].
See also Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL. L. REv. 971, 1035 (1991).
16. Kathryn Abrams, How to Have a Culture War, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1091, 1121 (1998)
(reviewing FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7). See also William N.

Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN. L. REV. 607, 611 (1994) (describing a gaylesbian

"story of rupture and resistance").
17. Kathryn Abrams, Unity, Narrativeand Law, 13 STUDIES IN LAW, POLITICS & SOCIETY 3, 5
(1993).
18. Richard Delgado, On Telling Stories in School: A Reply to Farberand Sherry, 46 VAND.
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part, legal narrative acts to disrupt the doctrinal form of legal analysis and
discourse-stories challenge non-stories. 20 In addition, legal narrative acts as a
"counterstory" to jar majoritarian stories. 2 1 The challenge posed by these
counterstories is twofold. First, they unmask what the racial majority deems to
be "truths" 22 and "objective standards" as "stories." 23 Second, the counterstories
"displace or overturn these... majoritarian myths and narratives." 24 Counterstories can expose the lie contained in majoritarian narratives. 25 They challenge
accounts by which majoritarians make sense of their world; stories such
as: without intent, no discrimination; outright racism is rare and
sporadic; we have all the civil rights legislation and case law we needany more would disadvantage innocent whites; some cultures unfor26
tunately have less ambition and ability than others; and so on.
Counterstories provide a means for undermining the "presuppositions, received
wisdoms, and shared understandings" that, on the one hand, are little attended
and simply presumed, and that, on the other, form the cognitive grounds on
27
whose bases legal and political decision occurs.
Narratives also operate differently than arms-length, "objective" doctrinal
analysis. They seek from their readers more than simple, rational, or abstract
understanding; instead, understanding of a narrative is affective, more lived,
"visceral." 28 Narratives also seek to lure the reader into a story; they work

L. REv. 665, 671 (1993) [hereinafter Delgado, On Telling Stories] ("[DIestruction of contingent,
comforting myths is often a necessary prelude to constructing a better, fairer world.") (responding
to Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal
Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REv. 807 (1993) [hereinafter Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories Out of
School]). See also Richard Delgado, Shadowboxing: An Essay on Power, 77 CORNELL L. REv.
813, 818 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado, Shadowboxing] ("A well-told counterstory can jar or
displace the dominant account.").
19. Richard Delgado, Storytelling for Oppositionists and Others: A Pleafor Narrative, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2411, 2414 (1989) [hereinafter Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionists].
20. See, e.g., PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS, THE ALCHEMY OF RACE AND RIGHTS 199 (1991)

(characterizing Bell's use of the fictional Geneva Crenshaw as an "instrument by which to attack
the monolithism of white patriarchal legal discourse.... the fiction who speaks from across the
threshold to the powerful unfiction of the legal order; [a] destroyer of the rational order.").
21. See Delgado, On Telling Stories, supra note 18, at 670-71. See also Delgado,
Shadowboxing, supra note 18, at 818.
22. See Delgado, On Telling Stories, supra note 18, at 670 ("Majoritarians tell stories .. . but
with the conviction that they are not stories at all, but the truth.").
23. See Delgado, Shadowboxing, supra note 18, at 818 (discussing how for actors who have
been in positions of power, "their subjectivity long ago was deemed 'objective' and imposed on
the world").
24. Id.
25. Richard Delgado, DerrickBell's Racial Realism: A Commentary on White Optimism and
Black Despair, 24 CONN. L. REV. 527, 530 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado, Derrick Bell's Racial
Realism].
26. Delgado, On Telling Stories, supra note 18 at 671.
27. Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionists,supra note 19, at 2413.
28. Abrams, The Narrativeand the Normative, supra note 15, at 53.
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noncoercively 29 and insinuatively 30 as they ask the reader to "suspend judgment." 3 1 Narratives ask the reader to reconcile two worlds: the text's and the
32
reader' S
Scholars have raised two major objections against the invocation of
narrative in law. The first is that claims presented in narratives are not testable
against objective criteria of knowledge. The work of Daniel Farber and Suzanna
Sherry 33 is representative of this objection. Farber and Sherry understand in abstraction narrative advocates' claims that narratives "are powerful means for
both creating and destroying mindset" 34 and "have a persuasive power that
transcends rational argument." 3 5 Farber and Sherry themselves acknowledge
that narratives "can be a source of empathetic understanding" 36 and "can
sometimes significantly affect their audiences." 3 7 But they argue that narratives
can also distort. We must have criteria, they maintain, to be able to evaluate
whether narratives are representative, accurate, and complete. 38 Using objective
39
standards, we must be able to assess the "veracity and verifiability" of a story.
As I shall explore in Parts II and III, I contend that Farber and Sherry appraise
narratives on the basis of their adequation to existing norms, whereas study of
the parable and Bell's employment of it demonstrate that narratives may instead
manifest new norms, new truths, and must be understood in that light. I return to
the more general defense of legal narrative in Part IV.
The second objection to the use of narratives in law is that they do not
sufficiently persuade. My colleague Richard Delgado poses this objection provocatively. In contrast to Farber and Sherry, Delgado has no doubts about the
verity of the message conveyed by authors such as Bell. "It is no accident that
Bell has a tremendous underground circulation and status in the minority community of color. We know that his message is true. '4 ° Instead, Delgado asks of

29. Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell and the Ideology of Racial Reform: Will We Ever Be
Saved?, 97 YALE L.J. 923, 947 (1988); Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionists, supra note 19, at
2415.
30. Richard Delgado, Brewer's Plea: Critical Thoughts on Common Cause, 44 VAND. L.
REv. 1, 13 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado, Brewer's Plea]. See also Delgado, Storytelling for
Oppositionists,supra note 19, at 2415, 2435.
31. Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionists,supra note 19, at 2415, 2440.
32. See id. at 2435.
33. See, e.g., FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7; Farber & Sherry,

Telling Stories Out of School, supra note 18. See also Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, The
200,000 Cards of Dimitri Yurasov: Further Reflections on Scholarship and Truth, 46 STAN. L.
REV. 647 (1994).
34. FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7, at 31.

35. Id. at 39. See also infra text accompanying notes 294-96.
36. Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School, supra note 18, at 830.
37. Id. at 826.
38. See FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7, at 39.
39. Id. at 99.
40. Delgado, DerrickBell's Racial Realism, supra note 25, at 530. Delgado's view contrasts
sharply with that of Farber and Sherry, who single out Bell specifically as a "social
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those who employ narrative to challenge racism whether they use too superficial
a tool to effect change: is narrative too idealistic and too attentive only to
contexts of discourse? Should the sources of racial entitlement and change be
41
acknowledged rather as more fundamentally predicated upon material factors?
Delgado differentiates between idealist and materialist schools of racial critique:
An "idealist" school holds that race and discrimination are largely
functions of attitude and social formation. For these thinkers, race is a
social construction created out of words, symbols, stereotypes, and
categories.... A second school holds that while text, attitude, and intention may play important roles in our system of racial hierarchy,
material factors such as profits and the labor market are even more
decisive in determining who falls where in that system. For these
"realists," racism is a means by which our system allocates privilege,
status, and wealth.4 2
Delgado expresses primary adherence to the materialist school.4 3
Proper appreciation of Delgado's stance requires reconciliation of his materialist orientation with his role, previously seen, as one of the most prominent
advocates of legal storytelling. 44 We must also understand how Delgado can
criticize idealism and yet demonstrate great respect for Bell's work.4 5 Indeed,
Delgado identifies Bell as another preeminent member of the materialist
school. 46 I return to these issues in Part V, but here I will concentrate on Delgado's more general objections to narrative. He contends that racial change
occurs not because of discourse, argument, or persuasion but as a result of
material conditions. In support of this argument, Delgado describes Bell's own
thesis of "interest convergence": 47 racial change in the United States, including
constructionist." FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7, at 4 ("In our view, social

constructionism [as espoused by Bell, among others,] poses a serious threat to our intellectual and
political community.").
41. See Delgado, Crossroads, supra note 9, at 123-24 (discussing the realist school's analysis

of how material factors have shaped our racial history and current racial hierarchy). See also
Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think About Race: Reflections on the Id, the Ego, and Other
Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEO. L.J. 2279, 2280 (2001) [hereinafter Delgado, Two

Ways] ("Ideal factors-thoughts, discourse, stereotypes, feelings, and mental categories--only
partially explain how race and racism work. Material factors-socioeconomic competition,
immigration pressures, the search for profits, changes in the labor pool, nativism-account for
even more, especially today.") (footnote omitted). The division between materialism and idealism
has been a significant one in Delgado's writings for years. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Explaining
the Rise and Fall ofAfrican American Fortunes-InterestConvergence and Civil Rights Gains, 37
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 369, 370-71 (2002) [hereinafter Delgado, Explaining].

42. Delgado, Crossroads,supra note 9, at 123-24.
43. See, e.g., id.at 124, 152; Delgado, Two Ways, supra note 41, at 2285.

44. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
45. See, e.g., Delgado, Crossroads,supra note 9, at 146-50.
46. Delgado, Explaining,supra note 41, at 371.
47. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980) [hereinafter Bell, Interest-ConvergenceDilemma].
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the effects of decisions such as Brown v. Board of Education,48 has occurred not
because of white altruism but because of white self-interest, including fears of
domestic disturbance and tainted international reputation. 49 Delgado and his
frequent coauthor, my colleague Jean Stefancic, have coined the term "empathic
fallacy" to criticize the belief that idealist vehicles such as speech, dialogue,
50
exhortation, and remonstrance will lead to reform of individual mindsets.
These vehicles fail because we are not autonomous entities who choose among
competing ideas. Instead, we enter debates with a preexisting structure of understanding. 5 1 Racism is itself part of the dominant understanding, on the basis of
which we reason; such widespread understanding resists change. 52 Thus, while
Delgado finds narratives such as Bell's to be true, they may fail because of
reader resistance. The quest for racial change must proceed on more material,
less ideal, grounds. In response to Delgado's challenge, I endeavor to show that
narratives as manifestations of new truths serve as a tool in the material arsenal
for change. There is materiality and vitality to the quest to change readers'
minds.
II.
NEW

TESTAMENT SCHOLARSHIP ON THE PARABLE

In this Part, I build the case for understanding narrative as a form of
manifestation of new insights and truths. I take as an illuminating example the
case of the New Testament parable.
The initial presupposition of the New Testament scholarship I shall describe
is that New Testament text is not literally the words of God but the product of
human-even if divinely inspired-hands. 53 The books of Matthew, Mark, and
Luke (the Synoptic Gospels) relate the story of Jesus's life and ministry, 54 but
they were written at least forty years after Jesus's crucifixion.5 5 Because of this
historical distance, scholars have tried to differentiate gospel material that may
more accurately record statements made by Jesus himself from other material the
gospel writers and the early Christian communities inserted. In particular, the
parables have been subject to this analysis because, as Norman Perrin writes,
48. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
49. Delgado, Crossroads,supra note 9, at 137-38. For discussion of Bell's theme of white
self-interest, see infra text accompanying notes 206-9.
50. See Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Images of the Outsider in American Law and
Culture: Can Free Expression Remedy Systemic Social Ills?, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1258, 1276,

1281 (1992) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Images of the Outsider]. See also id. at 1261
("[T]he empathic fallacy[] consists of believing that we can enlarge our sympathies through
linguistic means alone.").
51. Id. at 1280.
For further discussion of this point, see infra notes 333-39 and
accompanying text.
52. Delgado & Stefancic, Images of the Outsider,supra note 50, at 1279.
53. See, e.g., NORMAN PERRIN, THE NEW TESTAMENT: AN INTRODUCTION 7 (1974).
54. Id. at 8.
55. Id. at 7.
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"the parables are perhaps the most characteristic form of the speech of Jesus
56
himself."
A.

Literary Criticism

Interpretive inquiry into the parables has proceeded in four modes: textual
criticism, historical criticism, literary criticism, and the act of interpretation
itself.5 7 I briefly describe the first two modes in order to situate my elaboration

of the last two. Let me offer as an example the parable of the Good Samaritan
from the book of Luke. 58 Jesus tells the parable in the following way:
A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and he fell among
robbers, who stripped him and beat him and departed, leaving him halfdead. Now by chance a priest was going down that road, and when he
saw him he passed by on the other side. So likewise a Levite, when he
came to the place and saw him, passed by on the other side. But a
Samaritan, as he journeyed, came to where he was, and when he saw
him, he had compassion. He went to him and bound up his wounds,
pouring on oil and wine. Then he set him on his own animal and
brought him to an inn, and took care of him. And the next day he took
out two denarii [coins] and gave them to the innkeeper, saying, "Take
care of him, and whatever more you spend, I will repay you when I
come back." Which of these three, do you think, proved to be a neigh59
bor to the man who fell among the robbers?
Textual criticism establishes the "the text to be interpreted. ' 60 In the parables,
the issue is to differentiate statements made by Jesus from those added editorially by the gospel writers that may potentially change the parable's meaning. 6 1
In the parable of the Good Samaritan, scholars employing textual criticism have
argued that the verses surrounding the language just quoted do not belong to the
62
parable's original context and so were not part of the parable as told by Jesus.
The challenge of historical criticism is to decipher the meaning of a biblical
text as it was "understood by those for whom the text was written." 63 In the
56. NORMAN PERRIN, JESUS AND THE LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM: SYMBOL AND METAPHOR
IN NEw TESTAMENT INTERPRETATION 199 (1976) [hereinafter PERRIN, LANGUAGE OF THE
KINGDOM].
57. See id. at 9.
58. This parable is also prominent in the academic literature. See, e.g., id. at 162 (discussing
this parable as the author's "sample parable"); Thematic Section: The Parable of the Good
Samaritan,2 SEMEIA 1-131 (1974).
59. Luke 10:30-36 (English Standard).
60. PERRIN, LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 56, at 2.
61. See generally id. at 101-2 (discussing ways in which the parable must be reconstructed to
filter out changes made in the text as it was adapted and reinterpreted by various communities).
62. JOHN DOMINIC CROSSAN, IN PARABLES: THE CHALLENGE OF THE HISTORICAL JESUS 59-60
(1973) [hereinafter CROSSAN, IN PARABLES].
63. PERRIN, LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 56, at 4.
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Good Samaritan parable, historical criticism asks what the appearance of a Samaritan would mean to Jesus's Jewish audience. To these Jews, a Samaritan was
not some faceless, interchangeable placeholder but quite the contrary: "a hated
enemy, a half-breed, a perverter of true religion." 64 A Samaritan was a "socioreligious outcast." 65 To ask a Jew to conceive of a Samaritan as a neighbor was
to ask for the conjunction of two terms that were traditionally held apart. Only
when we comprehend the original, historical significance of the Samaritan can
we grasp the real import of this parable. To arrive at this interpretation, however, we need to complete textual and historical criticism with literary criticism.
Literary criticism asks us to contemplate, as a serious and independent
subject of inquiry, the nature of the literary form in which a message (such as the
parable) is conveyed. More particularly, the claim is that the literary structure
itself informs the message, both as to content and to the way in which the
message is conveyed. Fundamentally, the thought content is not "indifferent to
its literary vehicle." 66 The interpretive possibilities offered by literary criticism
are "new because they could not be discerned apart from the literary-critical considerations; they are valid because they arise out of the nature and natural force
of the literary form and language of the texts." 6 7 For my purposes, literary criticism forms the most significant advance in biblical interpretation. Moreover, I
shall argue that it comprises the most important source of insight for comprehension of the character of Bell's narratives. It is essential to the interpretation
of both Jesus's parables and Bell's texts that they be comprehended fundamentally as parables, and not as allegories.
1. Allegories

The charge of the New Testament scholarship on which I rely is that Jesus's
parables have too often been interpreted as allegories rather than as parables,
For instance, allegorical
even by the authors of the Synoptic Gospels.
commentary could be inserted in the biblical text either within or after the
parable; 68 similarly, later commentary would interpret Jesus's sayings in
allegorical form. As an example of allegory in the biblical text, consider the
commentary following the parable of the Sower. The parable talks of seed
falling on the path, on rocky ground, among thorns, or in good soil. 6 9 But to this
64. ROBERT W. FUNK, LANGUAGE, HERMENEUTIC,

AND WORD OF GOD: THE PROBLEM OF

LANGUAGE INTHE NEW TESTAMENT AND CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGY 212 (1966). Funk adds that
"[a]ccording to rabbinic teaching, an Israelite was not to accept alms or a work of love from a non-

Jew, since Israel's redemption is thereby delayed." Id. at 212 n.61 (citations omitted).
65. CROSSAN, IN PARABLES, supra note 62, at 64. See also id. ("'For Jews have no dealings
with Samaritans."') (quoting John 4:9).
66. PAUL RICOEUR, ESSAYS ON BIBLICAL INTERPRETATION 91 (Lewis S. Mudge ed., 1980)
[hereinafter RICOEUR, ESSAYS].
67. PERRIN, LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 56, at 9.

68. See id. at 8.
69. Mark 4:3-8.
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message the gospel writer adds several more verses allegorizing the parable: the
sower is sowing the word of God. The birds that eat the seed on the path are like
Satan taking away the word. The seeds sown on rocky ground do not have
strong enough roots, so in times of affliction they fall away. Those hearing the
word among the thorns allow other desires to choke out the word. However,
those sown in good soil that hear the word will bear fruit. 70 Similarly, the gospel
writer transforms a modest account of the Good Samaritan parable. The parable
71
tells us how to be a neighbor; it becomes "an allegory of charitable action."
Allegory has an educative, didactic, informative function. 72 It proceeds on
the basis of a double meaning. 73 There is an overt meaning-the story toldand then a meaning underneath that needs to be decoded.74 The overt meaning
is a vehicle for the expression of the covert meaning. When this covert meaning
is uncovered-when the overt meaning is translated into the covert meaningthe overt text can be discarded. It has served its purpose, and the covert meaning
can stand by itself.75 Under an allegorical reading, the parable of the Sower is
about the vagaries of belief; faith will grow or not depending on the nature of its
soil. 76 In the allegorical accounts of the Good Samaritan parable, the parable
tells how to be a neighbor. Once the underlying message is discerned, its
wrapping is no longer of any intrinsic value. Once the message is understood,
the allegory can be discarded. 77
2. Parables
To explore what is different about parables, let us return to the scholarly
explication of the Good Samaritan parable. Textual criticism has isolated the

70. Mark 4:14-20. For discussion of this parable, see, e.g., CROSSAN, IN PARABLES, supra
note 62, at 39-44, 50-51.
71. PAUL RiCOEUR, THE PHILOSOPHY OF PAUL RICOEUR 241-42 (Charles E. Reagan & David
Stewart eds., 1978) [hereinafter RiCOEUR, PHILOSOPHY] (discussing how the "Parable ceases to be
a Parable of the Kingdom" when "reduced to a moral teaching").
72. See, e.g., ROBERT SCHOLES & ROBERT KELLOGG, THE NATURE OF NARRATIVE 107 (1966)

(referring to allegory as "the kind of didactic narrative which emphasizes the illustrative meaning
of its characters, setting, and action").
73. Paul Ricoeur, The Nuptial Metaphor, in ANDREt LACOCQUE & PAUL RICOEUR, THINKING
BIBLICALLY: EXEGETICAL AND HERMENEUTICAL STUDIES 265, 286 (David Pellauer trans., 1998).
74. See, e.g., PERRIN, LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 56, at 6, 92.
75. See, e.g., PAUL RICOEUR, THE SYMBOLISM OF EVIL 163 (Emerson Buchanan trans., 1969)
[hereinafter RICOEUR, SYMBOLISM OF EVIL] ("An allegory can always be translatedinto a text that

can be understood by itself ...").
76. See, e.g., CROSSAN, IN PARABLES, supra note 62, at 44.
77. Later I shall briefly examine how allegorical elements may operate within a story that
remains fundamentally parabolic. See infra note 108. This conjunction may explain the use of the
subversive allegory in contexts such as the black church, where "allegory has remained a vibrant
form of proclamation." JOHN R. DONAHUE, S.J., THE GOSPEL IN PARABLE: METAPHOR, NARRATIVE,
AND THEOLOGY IN THE SYNOPTIC GOSPELS 12 (1988). There the overt contents of the message are
not discarded but have their own parabolic force. This example is of interest for possible analogies

to Bell's work. See infra text accompanying notes 221-36.
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relevant text,7 8 and historical criticism has demonstrated that the Samaritan was
considered an enemy of the Jew. 7 9 The Samaritan is someone whom the victim
does not expect to help, and indeed someone from whom the victim does not
want assistance. 80 Linguistic criticism now attends to how the language of the
text operates. The text asks the listener to put together for the same person two
contradictory words: "Samaritan" and "neighbor."
John Dominic Crossan
argues, "The whole thrust of the story demands that one say what cannot be said,
what is a contradiction in terms: Good + Samaritan.... [W]hen good (clerics)
and bad (Samaritan) become, respectively, bad and good, a world is being
challenged and we are faced with polar reversal. 8 1 The literal conflict turns
over the listener's world and challenges its presumptions. 8 2 The underlying
force of the parable, says Crossan,
is that just so does the Kingdom of God break abruptly into human
consciousness and demand the overturn of prior values, closed options,
set judgments, and established conclusions.... The hearer struggling
with the contradictory dualism of Good/Samaritan is actually
experiencing in and through this the inbreaking of the Kingdom. Not
83
only does it happen like this, it happens in this.
The parable is a language event.84 The listener's experience may be transformed
in and through the force of the parable's language; she may experience a new
reality. 85 The parable of the Sower operates in a similar fashion. Its emphasis is
not fundamentally on growth, but on the miracle of production occasioned by the
small seed. "It is like this that the Kingdom is in advent. It is surprise and it is
gift."'86 The crux, then, is that "the kingdom of God is not what the parables tell
about, but what happens in parables." 87 The parable is the "bearer[] of the
reality with which [it is] concerned. '88 This conception makes clear that
78. See supra text accompanying notes 60-62.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 63-65.
80. FUNK, supra note 64, at 213.
81. CROSSAN, IN PARABLES, supra note 62, at 64.
82. Recognition of the disruptive power of parable seems to be retained by a variety of more
recent interpreters. See, e.g., DONAHUE, supra note 77, at 15 ("In terms of image and subject
matter the parables are realistic, but in the unfolding of the parable the realism is shattered.");
Blomberg, supra note 10, at 232 (maintaining that the parables' message "regularly subverts
conventional wisdom in shocking ways"). See also id. at 252 (contrasting his conservative parable
scholarship with Donahue's more liberal scholarship).
83. CROSSAN, IN PARABLES, supra note 62, at 65-66.
84. FUNK, supra note 64, at 220. See also PERRIN, LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note
56, at 138, 146, 178.

85. See Dan 0. Via, Parable and Example Story: A Literary-StructuralistApproach, 1
SEMEIA 105, 118 (1974) ("The narrative parables ... give a new vision of everyday existence as
transected by the surprising incursion of the transcendent.").
86. CROSSAN, IN PARABLES, supra note 62, at 51.
87. PAUL RICOEUR, FIGURING THE SACRED: RELIGION, NARRATIVE, AND IMAGINATION 165
(David Pellauer trans., Mark I. Wallace ed., 1995) [hereinafter RICOEUR, FIGURING THE SACRED].
88. PERRIN, LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 56, at 55-56.

Reprinted with the Permission of New York University School of Law

N. Y. U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE

[Vol. 31:225

although the language of an allegory can be discarded when its underlying
89
message is discovered, the same is not true for the parable.
3. Parableas metaphoric
Characterization of the parable as metaphoric provides the crux of the
scholarly insight about the parable as a literary form 9° and clarifies why parable,
in contrast to allegory, is not eliminable. The most extended, relevant discussion
91
of metaphor arises in Paul Ricoeur's magisterial tome, The Rule of Metaphor.
I will first summarize briefly his thesis there and then turn to his and others'
assessment of metaphor in the parable context.
In his more general work, Ricoeur concentrates on the "rifts" metaphor
creates in an existing order and the processes by which metaphor "disturbs and
displaces" order.92 Metaphoric predication arises when there is a "clash" in
literal meaning; metaphor creates new meaning in the space where there is literal
contradiction. 9 3 Metaphor destroys the literal order in order to present a new
order. 94 As Ricoeur writes elsewhere, metaphor "break[s] through previous
categorization and... establish[es] new logical boundaries on the ruins of the
preceding ones." 9 5 In his work more directly analyzing parable, Ricoeur
describes the parable as conjoining a metaphorical process with a narrative
form. 9 6 The bearer of the metaphor is the parabolic narrative as a whole in its
tension with ordinary life and reality. 9 7 The parable is "the metaphorization of a

89. See DONAHUE, supra note 77, at 12-13.
90. See, e.g., PERRIN, LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 56, at 123 (arguing that

"consideration of a form of language which uses comparison but which can serve as a vehicle for
the disclosure of ultimacy... [should lead] to a consideration of the nature, function, and power of
metaphor").
91. PAUL RjCOEUR, THE RULE OF METAPHOR: MULTI-DISCIPLINARY STUDIES OF THE CREATION
OF MEANING

IN LANGUAGE

(Robert Czemy trans., 1977) [hereinafter RICOEUR, RULE OF

To anticipate, note the subtitle: The Creation of Meaning in Language.
As the Article's attention to Ricoeur begins to increase, let me clarify my bias. I studied
under Ricoeur in graduate school and edited his book on ideology and utopia. See PAUL RICOEUR,
METAPHOR].

LECTURES ON IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIA (George H. Taylor ed., 1986) [hereinafter RICOEUR,
LECTURES].
92. RICOEUR, RULE OF METAPHOR,

supra note 91, at 22.
93. Id. at 194.
94. Id. at 22. Contrast Ricoeur's emphasis on the metaphoric displacement of existing order
with the work on metaphor by cognitive theorists George Lakoff and Mark Johnson. Under their
approach, the target domain in metaphor simply carries over and preserves the source domain.
See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, PHILOSOPHY IN THE FLESH: THE EMBODIED MIND AND
ITS CHALLENGE TO WESTERN THOUGHT 91 (1999).

Elsewhere I analyze at greater length the

contrast between Ricoeur's model of metaphor and Lakoff and Johnson's. See George H. Taylor,
Cognitive Theory, Conscience, and Law, 6 GRAVEN IMAGES (forthcoming 2007).
95. RICOEUR, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 71, at 131.

96. Paul Ricoeur, Biblical Hermeneutics, 4 SEMEIA 27, 30 (1975). Subsequently, Ricoeur
will add a third trait of parable-that its qualifier is the Kingdom of God. See id. at 32-33.
97. Id. at 95. In later work, Ricoeur also talks of the metaphoric process of the narrativeparable as arising in the relationship between the parable and the larger narrative that encompasses
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discourse."

98

Several lessons emerge from the analysis. First, appreciation of the
metaphoric quality of parable is an insight into its literary form. The metaphoric
capacity of parable is a prominent theme in the work of Ricoeur and other
biblical scholars who take literary criticism seriously. 9 9 Second, as a language
event, the parable as metaphor produces new possibilities: 0 0 it is "creative of
meaning," 10 1 it says "something new about reality,"' 10 2 it is "revelatory.' ' 3
Third, because the parable lives and is productive in its metaphoric moment, it
cannot be reduced to the terms of prior, literal meaning in three senses. On the
one hand, it is a language event: it has force, it transforms. Further, as creative
of meaning, it says something new in a way that transforms prior categories. 104
Finally, as metaphoric, parable "induces a vision of that which cannot be
conveyed by prosaic or discursive speech."' 10 5 It is "untranslatable." 1°6 While
an allegory points to its underlying meaning and can be discarded when that
meaning is found, 10 7 the parable as metaphor cannot be discarded, because it is
the parable's metaphoric weight and density that conveys and bears its

meaning.

10 8

it. This latter narrative about the Kingdom of God is "an expression that orients the whole process
of transgression." RICOEUR, FIGURING THE SACRED, supra note 87, at 147. Attention to the
metaphoric role of the parable as a whole helps explain why some parables, such as the Sower (see
supra text accompanying note 69) can function metaphorically even though internally, unlike the
Good Samaritan (see supra text accompanying notes 81-83), they do not seem to present
metaphoric clashes with everyday life. RICOEUR, FIGURING THE SACRED, supra note 87, at 147.
98. RICOEUR, FIGURING THE SACRED, supra note 87, at 161 (emphasis omitted).

99. See, e.g., FUNK, supra note 64, at 213. In the parable of the Good Samaritan,
[t]he "logic" of everydayness is broken upon the "logic" of the parable. It is the
juxtaposition of the two logics that turns the Samaritan, and hence the parable, into a
metaphor.... If it is the literal meaning of Samaritan that provides the initial jolt to the
everyday mentality embodied in the story, it is the nonliteral meaning that triggers,
through the parable, a whole new vista ....
Id. See also id. at 133-62 (chapter titled The Parableas Metaphor).
100. See RICOEUR, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 71, at 245 ("The poetic power of the Parable is
the power of the Event .... Poetic means creative.").

101. FUNK, supra note 64, at 137.
102. Ricoeur, Biblical Hermeneutics, supra note 96, at 80.
103. PERRIN, LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 56, at 129 ("[T]he idea of the parable

as revelatory image remains central.").
104. See, e.g., Ricoeur, Biblical Hermeneutics, supra note 96, at 79 (discussing how in
metaphor "a new signification emerges ...which has no status in established language and which
exists only in the attribution of unusual predicates").
105. FUNK, supra note 64, at 136. Since it seems that every contemporary work with any
kind of religious or theological subject must make reference to Dan Brown's The Da Vinci Code,
the following reference from that book seems apt here: "Metaphors are a way to help our minds
process the unprocessible." DAN BROWN, THE DA VINCI CODE 341-42 (2003).

106. Ricoeur, Biblical Hermeneutics,supra note 96, at 80 (speaking of metaphor).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 72-77.
108. See PERRIN, LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 56, at 135 (discussing how, in the

parable, the Kingdom of God "confronts us through the power of metaphor.., to be the bearer of
reality, to induce vision").
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4. Parableas manifestation

How may we summarize the literary critical insight into the productive
capacity of the metaphoric language event that is parable? Here I take the
parables as exemplary of how Ricoeur defines religious texts more generally.
are poetic: 109 they have the power of "breaking through" and
Religious texts
",opening."11 0 They "ruptur[e] the ordinary."''
Two essential points must be
of
drawn-points that I will argue are also essential in understanding the import 113
112
First, in rupturing the ordinary, parables disorient.
Derrick Bell's work.
They provoke a tension with the ordinary. They ask us to confront the assumed
contradiction between Samaritan and neighbor1 14 and so challenge us to reassess
literal terms whose meaning we had assumed and taken for granted. But
parables "disorient only in order to reorient us." 1 1 5 Through the productive
power of the metaphoric parable, we "discover another way of seeing." 116 So
the first essential point is that methodologically, the parables proceed as
"reorientationby disorientation."117

The second essential point is that the poetic function of parable vivifies "a
new concept of truth as manifestation-and in this sense as revelation[.]" 1 18
Ricoeur writes:
[T]he poetic function incarnates a concept of truth that escapes the
definition by adequation as well as the criteria of falsification and
verification. Here truth no longer means verification, but manifestation,
i.e., letting what shows itself be.... It is in this sense of manifestation
119
that language in its poetic function is a vehicle of revelation.
More recently, scholars (including Crossan and Ricoeur, who articulated the divide) have
argued that the separation between allegory and parable may not be as great as once thought. See,
e.g., Ricoeur, Biblical Hermeneutics, supra note 96, at 35; John Dominic Crossan, Parable,
Allegory, and Paradox, in 9 SEMIOLOGY AND PARABLES 247, 264-78 (Daniel Patte ed., 1976).
Increasingly, some scholars agree, for instance, that Jesus may have used allegory in his
presentation of the parables. See, e.g., DONAHUE, supra note 77, at 12. This newer understanding,
however, does nothing to diminish the larger insight of biblical literary criticism about the
parables. The parables remain metaphoric; they convey and create new meaning; they are nonreducible.
109. See RICOEUR, FIGURING THE SACRED, supra note 87, at 43.
110. RiCOEUR, ESSAYS, supra note 66, at 104.
111. RICOEUR, FIGURING THE SACRED, supra note 87, at 60 ("The paradoxical universe of the
parable... is a 'burst' or an 'exploded' universe."). Perrin writes of how parable "startle[s] the
imagination" and "shatter[s] ...that everyday world." PERRIN, LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM,
supra note 56, at 106, 199.
112. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 192-95.
113. RICOEUR, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 71, at 244.
114. See supra text accompanying note 81.
115. RICOEUR, FIGURING THE SACRED, supra note 87, at 281.
116. Id.
117. See RICOEUR, PHILOSOPHY, supranote 71, at 244 (emphasis added).
118. RICOEUR, ESSAYS, supra note 66, at 98 (emphasis added).
119. Id. at 102. See also RiCOEUR, FIGURING THE SACRED, supra note 87, at 72 ("[T]he
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Parable manifests new meaning; its reorientation by disorientation brings new
meaning into being. A concept of truth as manifestation is bound to be
troubling, Ricoeur acknowledges, to more traditional linguistic analysis.
Linguistic analysis is so heavily determined by the history of the
principles of verification and falsification that it is very difficult for this
school of thought to conceive of a concept of truth that would not be
taken for granted and defined a priori as adequation. The idea... that
truth may mean not adequation but manifestation seems to be alien to
120
the main thesis of linguistic analysis ....
Theories of adequation and verification assume the propriety of testing insights
by their congruence to established norms and truths. They do not appear to
allow for the manifestation of new truths, new revelations. In contrast,
manifestation may confront, disrupt, and displace old truths in order to bring
new ones to light. "[M]etaphor," writes Ricoeur, "not only shatters the previous
structures of our language, but also the previous structures of what we call
metaphor we experience the metamorphosis of both language
reality.... With
12 1
and reality."'
5. The role of the reader
The final element of the literary critical inquiry assesses the role played by
the reader. The parable as metaphor disorients by presenting a clash with known
reality: the juxtaposition of Samaritan and neighbor. At the same time, the
metaphor reorients by producing new meaning-the Samaritan is a neighborbut the reader must grasp and complete the meaning. 122 The parable is in need
of interpretation. 123 In part, the ability of the individual to interpret depends on
the audience to which a text is addressed: whether it speaks primarily to those
who already believe or, like the parable, to the "whole people."' 124 But the
ability to interpret also depends on the individual's own openness to the
message. On the one hand, the reader may grasp the metaphor, but on the other,

process of revelation is a permanent process of opening something that is closed, of making
manifest something that was hidden.").
120. RiCOEUR, FIGURING THE SACRED, supra note 87, at 36.
121. RICOEUR, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 71, at 132-33. Dan Stiver finds in Ricoeur's analysis

of metaphor and narrative keys to "the cognitive disclosiveness of religious language." DAN R.
STIVER, THEOLOGY AFTER RICOEUR: NEW DIRECTIONS IN HERMENEUTICAL THEOLOGY 249 (2001)

(emphasis added).
122. Ricoeur argues this need for interpretation is true for all reading. See 3 PAUL RICOEUR,
TIME AND NARRATIVE, at 159 (Kathleen Blarney & David Pellauer trans., Univ. Chi. Press 1988)
(1985) ("It is only in reading that the dynamism of configuration completes its course.").
123. See Ricoeur, Biblical Hermeneutics, supra note 96, at 133.
124. Id. at 132-33 (distinguishing the openness of the parable from eschatological
discourse-treatment of the final days-which principally addresses "the relatively closed
audience of believers already initiated into this mode of discourse").
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the reader may refuse it, reject it, want to reduce it to accustomed literal terms, or
not allow it to work. 125 In the parable, comments Robert Funk,
the hearer is confronted with a situation in relation to which he must
decide how to comport himself: is he willing to allow himself to be the
victim, to smile at the affront to the priest and Levite, to be served by an
make some response.
enemy? The parable invites, nay, compels him12to
6
And it is this response that is decisive for him.
The operation of the parable itself does not foreordain the response. The
contingency of listener response is well reflected in the parable of the Sower: no
the ground in which it is sown
matter what the quality of the seed, the quality of
127
flourishes.
it
well
how
in
difference
a
will make

125. According to one scholar,
Parable interpreters may in the process of working with the text find that it teases or
intrigues the mind into meaningful insight, or they may find that it does not. Such
insight, if it occurs, results from the interaction of text and interpreter and not from the
domination of either one by the other.
MARY ANN TOLBERT, PERSPECTIVES ON THE PARABLES 43 (1979). Cognitive psychology also
emphasizes the role played by the reader, particularly in resisting a change of mind. In the first
place, "[i]t is never easy to bring about a change of mind .. " HOWARD GARDNER, CHANGING
MINDS 92 (2004). Further, change is even more difficult when reader resistance is strong. See id.
at 18, 211.
126. FUNK, supra note 64, at 214.
127. See Mark 4:3-8. As we close discussion of literary criticism of the parables, let me
briefly summarize some of the theological debate occasioned by the literary critical enterprise.
Since (for purposes of the article) I am less concerned with theological questions than with the
possible adoption more generally of any interpretive insights gained here, my attention to the
theological debate will be only suggestive. To the extent the debate is germane for questions of
more general interpretive analysis, I will return to those issues at a later point. See infra note 312.
Literary criticism first participates in the debate over the role played by the reader of or listener to
Jesus's sayings and the Gospel more generally. As evident from the parable of the Sower, the
debate here is a longstanding one over whether an individual's belief turns on individual decision
(i.e., the receptivity of her soil), on the gift of divine grace, or both. Consider a traditional
Protestant account: "Luther and Calvin affirmed that faith is both a gift and a decision. Without
the gift, the decision is not related to the experience of God's forgiving love. Yet the experience of
God's mercy, and the affirmation that God has led one to this experience, do not vitiate decision."
JOHN DILLENBERGER & CLAUDE WELCH, PROTESTANT CHRISTIANITY INTERPRETED THROUGH ITS
DEVELOPMENT 31 (1954).

Second and more importantly, the literary critical approach is itself subject to debate because
in its emphasis on the alleged production of the parable as metaphor, it appears to conflate the

operation of language with the operation of divine grace. As one commentator notes, "[t]he
impression arises that at times salvation comes from metaphor alone!" DONAHUE, supra note 77,
at 11. Hans Frei provocatively criticizes the literary critical approach for rendering Jesus as merely
allegorical: he represents the embodiment-and only that-of an underlying, more generally
available process of the poetic production of meaning. See Hans W. Frei, The "LiteralReading"
of Biblical Narrative in the Christian Tradition: Does It Stretch or Will It Break?, in THE BIBLE
AND THE NARRATIVE TRADITION 36, 48 (1986) [hereinafter Frei, "LiteralReading"]. For a defense
of Ricoeur, see, e.g., STIVER, supra note 121, at 245 (differentiating Ricoeur's philosophy from his
theology).
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B. The Act of Interpretation
Textual criticism, historical criticism, and literary criticism all subserve the
final stage in the analytic process: "the act of interpretation itself."128 Here my
concern is less with the act of interpretation by the believer-already adverted to
briefly above 129-but rather interpretation by the scholar undertaking the rigors
of critical analysis (which is perhaps undertaken by believers, but perhaps not). I
am also interested in a more self-critical assessment of how the interpretive
process proceeds. In this inquiry, the parable and religious discourse become
subsumed within more general poetic phenomena.
1. Understanding
The initial premise here is that there are legitimate modes of thought and
experience other than those that have predominated in the lineage of Western
philosophy.130 These alternative poetic forms of expression must be recovered
and renewed. Recall the contrast between manifestation and adequation, and the
need to preserve and protect a space for the former against the rule of the latter.
We have, Ricoeur writes, "uncritically accept[ed] a certain concept of truth
defined as adequation to real objects and as submitted to a criterion of empirical
verification." 13 1 By contrast, language in its poetic function suspends "the reign
of truth as adequation and the very definition of truth in terms of verification" in
order to liberate a "more primitive, more originary" domain. 132 James Kugel
writes of a lost manner of seeing: a careful reading of the Hebrew Bible
demonstrates that "a certain way of perceiving.., has gradually closed inside of
us, so that nowadays most people simply do not register, or do not have access
to, what had been visible in an earlier age." 133 We must remember, though, he
adds, that what was "otherwise" is "not unrelated to what exists in the fullest
reality of today." 134 Kugel, Ricoeur, and others try to recapture the kind of
128. PERRIN, LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 56, at 9.
129. Supra text accompanying note 125.
130. See LACOCQUE & RICOEUR, supra note 73, at xvi. As Ricoeur discusses elsewhere,

elements of Western philosophy may in fact not be immune to these alternatives. He observes that
Kant invokes a
power of the imagination "to present" (Darstellung)those ideas of reason for which we
have no concept. By means of such representation, the imagination "occasions much
thought (viel zu denken) without however any definite thought, i.e., any concept, being
capable of being adequate to it; it consequently cannot be completely compassed and
made intelligible by language."
supra note 66, at 116 (quoting IMMANUEL KANT, CRITIQUE OF JUDGMENT 157

RICOEUR, ESSAYS,

(J.H. Bernard trans., 1966)).
131. RICOEUR, ESSAYS, supra note 66, at 101.

132. Id.
133. KUGEL, GREAT POEMS, supra note 10, at 36.
134. JAMES L. KUGEL, THE GOD OF OLD: INSIDE THE LOST WORLD OF THE BIBLE 199 (2003)

[hereinafter KUGEL, THE GOD OF OLD]. See also KUGEL, GREAT POEMS, supra note 10, at 36
(arguing that biblical texts not only bear witness to a different way of seeing but "perhaps invite us,
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seeing available in myth. 13 5 The task is to become open to the poetic
manifestation. This task is perhaps best captured in the metaphor not of seeing
but of listening or hearing-of attending to and opening oneself to what is
expressed. "This hearing which understands," Ricoeur writes, "is the crux of our
problem."' 136 To listen is first to attempt to understand, and not to critique; it is
to offer oneself to "the possible mode of being-in-the-world which the text opens
up and discloses... ."137 Understanding is the opposite of self-projection: it
allows "the work and its world [to] enlarge the horizon of [one's] own selfunderstanding."' 138 As Ricoeur writes specifically of the parables,
we need to
139
permit the work's "poetic power [to] display itself within us."
2. Interpretation
To allow the poetic its power to display is to think on the basis of the poetic
display, on the basis of what the metaphor, parable, or symbol gives, and the
transformative meaning it creates. 140 We must retain the recognition here that,
in order to be true to the poetic meaning, the poetic cannot be reduced; its
meaning is not transparent but opaque, rich, thick, and inexhaustible. 14 1 At the
same time, the poetic gift must be interpreted. 14 2 Analytic tools must be brought
with the use of some spiritual imagination, to try to enter into it, open our eyes, and look").
135. See, e.g., KUGEL, THE GOD OF OLD, supra note 134, at 15-18; PAUL RICOEUR, THE
CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS: ESSAYS IN HERMENEUTICS 284 (Don lhde ed., Nw. Univ. Press
1974) (1969) [hereinafter RiCOEUR, CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS] ("Something is discovered,

unconcealed, which, without myth, would have remained covered, concealed."); id. at 300
(discussing the power of myth "to open and uncover"). In a fictional account, Roberto Calasso
taps into this power to open and uncover in a wonderful and lyrical evocation of Greek myth.
ROBERTO CALASSO, THE MARRIAGE OF CADMUS AND HARMONY (Tim Parks trans., Knopf 1993)
(1988). See, e.g., id. at 280 ("For centuries people have spoken of the Greek myths as of
something to be rediscovered, reawoken. The truth is it is the myths that are still out there waiting
to wake us and be seen by us, like a tree waiting to greet our newly opened eyes.").
136. RICOEUR, CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 135, at 450. See also KUGEL, THE
GOD OF OLD, supra note 134, at 200 ("[Tlhese texts have always been there, ready to do the
talking, if only we are ready to listen."); HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 462 (Joel

Weinsheimer & Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed., Continuum 1995) (1986) ("[T]he primacy
of hearing is the basis of the hermeneutical phenomenon ....); id. at 465 ("The hermeneutical
experience also has its own rigor: that of uninterrupted listening.").
137. PAUL RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 177 (John B. Thompson ed.

& trans., 1981).
138. RICOEUR, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 71, at 145.

139. Id. at 245.
140. In an early formulation, Ricoeur argues that the symbol "gives rise to" thought. E.g.,
RICOEUR, CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 135, at 299; RICOEUR, SYMBOLISM OF EvIL,
supra note 75, at 348.
141. See, e.g., RICOEUR, CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 135, at 289-90
(differentiating signs which are transparent from symbolic signs, which are opaque and have an
"inexhaustible depth").
142. See, e.g., Ricoeur, Biblical Hermeneutics,supra note 96, at 35 (maintaining that, in the
context of interpreting religious texts, religious language "implies a tension between 'image' and

'meaning' which calls for interpretation. Nowhere is religious discourse freed of a minimal
attempt to interpret it").
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to bear in order to sort out and decipher what the poetic means. Ricoeur has
described this movement from the figurative to the conceptual as an inherent
dynamism. 14 3 In other work, Ricoeur advocates an approach to interpretation
conceived as functioning at the intersection between "two domains, metaphorical
and speculative.... On one side, interpretation seeks the clarity of the concept;
on the other, it hopes to preserve the dynamism of meaning that the concept
144
holds and pins down."
How does this tension between symbol and thought, the metaphoric and the
speculative, operate? Ricoeur's answer is unapologetic. The relationship is
circular: "We must understand in order to believe, but we must believe in order
to understand." 14 5 We must believe in order to understand: the interpreter
cannot fully engage with a text unless she lives "in the aura of the meaning that
is sought."' 146 The interpreter need not necessarily "believe-with" that is, share
the faith of the home community or the individual author, but "reading and
interpretation through imagination and sympathy... [are] the minimum
condition[s] for access to the meaning of the[] texts." 14 7 We must also
understand in order to believe in two senses: we must decipher the poetic
meaning by interpretation, 148 and we must apply interpretive tools-such as
textual, historical, and literary criticism-so that we may hear again, 14 9 so that
we may hear what the text is trying to say.
The interpretive circle between belief and understanding still permits
critique. It is not viciously circular-neither tautologous, nor self-confirmingbut alive and dynamic.150 As Ricoeur explicates more broadly, the elements of
understanding include both understanding (the sympathetic regard for meaning)
and explanation (the analytic inquiry).151 Understanding is mediated by explanation. 152 Recall the example just noted of the employment of textual,
historical, and literary criticism in interpretation of the parables. The goal is
143. See id. at 133.
144. RICOEUR, RULE OF METAPHOR, supra note 91, at 303 (rejecting a "destruction of the
metaphorical by the conceptual"). Ricoeur has also argued that "[b]etween the concept which kills
the symbol and pure conceptual silence, there must be room for a conceptual language which

preserves the tensive character of symbolic language." Ricoeur, Biblical Hermeneutics, supra note
96, at 36.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

RICOEUR, SYMBOLISM OF EVIL, supra note 75, at 351.
RICOEUR, CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 135, at 298.
LACOCQUE & RICOEUR, supra note 73, at xvii.
See supra text accompanying note 141.
RICOEUR, SYMBOLISM OF EVIL, supra note 75, at 351.
150. See id.; RiCOEUR, CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 135, at 298.
151. See, e.g., PAUL RICOEUR, What is a text? Explanation and understanding, in
HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 137, at 145.
152. See RdCOEuR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 137, at 220. See
also George H. Taylor, Critical Hermeneutics: The Intertwining of Explanation and

Understandingas Exemplified in Legal Analysis, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1101 (2000) (discussing
how understanding and explanation are not opposed but inextricably interconnected and can be
integrated into the law).
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understanding, but the analysis is also critical: it challenges and undermines the
53
sufficiency of allegorical interpretation of the parables. 1
When Ricoeur claims that interpretation functions at the intersection of two
domains that either seek "the clarity of the concept" or hope "to preserve the
dynamism of meaning," 154 this is another way of stating that interpretation
functions at the intersection of explanation and understanding. In recognition of
this interplay between understanding and explanation, Ricoeur argues that
religious testimony itself must be subject to interpretation and testing.
155
Testimony comprises both manifestation and a crisis of appearance.
Furthermore, Ricoeur argues that a distinction must be drawn "between the false
witness and the truthful one," 156 as those works and signs of manifestation are
liable to judgment. 15 7 The kind of judgment available, however, is one of
probability, not certainty. 15 8 We remain within the requirements of a sphere of
manifestation rather than one of adequation.
III.
BELL'S NARRATIVES

Based on the previous analysis of parables, I now argue that Derrick Bell's
fictional narratives are best understood as parables. 15 9 I argue for this
characterization even though Bell more frequently refers to his fictions as
allegories 160 in his own writings and only rarely as parables 16 1 or "metaphorical
153. See supra text accompanying notes 84-89 (discussing how different forms of criticism
help readers understand parables, and yet parables cannot simply be discarded).
154. See RICOEUR, RULE OF METAPHOR, supra note 91, at 303.
155. RICOEUR, ESSAYS, supra note 66, at 146.
156. Id. at 112.

157. Id. at 146.
158. As Ricouer notes,
In terms of the modality of judgment, the interpretation of testimony is only probable,
but it only appears as such when compared to a scientific ideal which governs only one
of the different requirements of thought, which reigns in only one of the centers of
reflection, namely knowledge of objects.
Id. at 150.
159. Setting aside his textbooks, Bell has written seven other books. Four of these contain
fictional narratives.
See AFROLANTICA LEGACIES (1998) [hereinafter BELL, AFROLANTICA
LEGACIES]; GOSPEL CHOIRS: PSALMS OF SURVIVAL FOR AN ALIEN LAND CALLED HOME (1996)
[hereinafter BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS]; FACES AT THE BoTToM, supra note 1; and AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED: THE ELUSIVE QUEST FOR RACIAL JUSTICE (1987) [hereinafter BELL, AND WE ARE NOT
SAVED]. Bell's remaining three books are nonfiction. See SILENT COVENANTS: BROWN V.BOARD OF
EDUCATION AND THE UNFULFILLED HOPES FOR RACIAL REFORM (2004) [hereinafter BELL, SILENT
COVENANTS]; ETHICAL AMBITION: LIVING A LIFE OF MEANING AND WORTH (2002) [hereinafter
BELL, ETHICAL AMBITION]; CONFRONTING AUTHORITY: REFLECTIONS OF AN ARDENT PROTESTER
(1994) [hereinafter BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY].
I will concentrate on representative
narratives from the four books of fiction.
160. See, e.g., BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 159, at 78; BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED,
supra note 159, at 6-7; Derrick Bell, The Power of Narrative,23 LEGAL STUD. F. 315, 316 (1999)
[hereinafter Bell, Power of Narrative] (referring to fictions as allegories).
Bell has also
characterized certain of his individual narratives as allegories. See, e.g., BELL, FACES AT THE
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tales."' 162 While some of his narratives do include allegorical elements, the
163
nature of the narratives' messages signifies the operation of a parable.
Ultimately, Bell's stories themselves reveal the nature of his literary method and
message.
A. The Racial Preference Licensing Act
164
The Racial Preference Licensing Act is one of Bell's most forceful tales.
165
The President in this story acknowledges that racial tolerance does not exist,
and that laws that attempt to police and change individuals' morals are difficult
to enforce. 166 State-enforced policies of racial integration have not been
effective. 16 7 The President signs into law the Racial Preference Licensing Act in
an effort to replace the8 state's failing policies, based on ethics, with action based
6
on the marketplace. 1

BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 135 (describing A Law Professor's Protest found in id. at 127-34 as
"allegorical traged[y]"); Bell, Power of Narrative, at 345 (describing "The Space Traders" found
in Faces at the Bottom of the Well at 158-94, as "allegory"); Derrick Bell, An Allegorical Critique
of the United States Civil Rights Model, in DISCRIMINATION: THE LIMITS OF LAW 3 (Bob Hepple &

Erika M. Szyszczak eds., 1992) (publishing (and describing as "allegory") a variation of "The
Racial Preference Licensing Act" found in Faces at the Bottom of the Well at 47-64).
161. See, e.g., BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 159, at 38; BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED,

supra note 159, at 253 (referring to his fictions as parables).
162. See, e.g., BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 159, at 6 (describing his fictions as
"metaphorical tales"); id. at 253 (referring to his fictions as "merely metaphorical essays").
163. See infra text accompanying notes 221-36. My treatment of parable in legal scholarship
appears distinctive. Recourse to parable has appeared on a number of occasions in legal
scholarship. See, e.g., NORVAL MORRIS, THE BROTHEL BOY AND OTHER PARABLES OF THE LAW
(1992); E. Allan Farnsworth, Parables about Promises: Religious Ethics and Contract
Enforceability, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 695 (2002); Steven D. Smith, Religion, Democracy, and
Autonomy: A PoliticalParable,42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 685 (2001); Patrick J. Long, The Good
Samaritan and Admiralty: A Parable of a Statute Lost at Sea, 48 BUFF. L. REV. 591 (2000); John
Copeland Nagle, A Twentieth Amendment Parable,72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 470 (1997); Martha Minow,
Some Realism About Rulism: A Parablefor the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure,137 U. PA. L. REV. 2249 (1989).
In these works parable is employed, not thematized. Discussion of parable as a subject within
legal scholarship is, however, much more infrequent. See, e.g., G. Edward White, The Parableas
Legal Scholarship, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1508 (1989) (reviewing ROBERT BURT, Two JEWISH
JUSTICES: OUTCASTS IN THE PROMISED LAND (1988)); Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law and the

Teaching of the Parables,93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984). White criticizes Burt's book as a parable that
prioritizes the structure of an argument over evidence in support of it. See, e.g., White, supra, at
1519. White also says Burt's work "is a parable presented as legal scholarship." Id. at 1526.
Burt's article compares the degree to which the parables and the courts do and do not rely on
command to ensure assent. See Burt, supra, at 502. It is ironic that White criticizes Burt's book as
parabolic (which, as it happens, does not make reference to parable), while Burt's article defends
recourse to parable.
164. See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 47-64.
165. See id. at 47.
166. Id. at 51.
167. See id. at 49.
168. Id. at 51.
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The Act permits employers and property owners to buy a license to
discriminate on the basis of race and color. 16 9 Licensees can therefore refuse to
hire minority employees, serve minority customers, or house minority tenants.
However, proprietors must display their licenses prominently to alert potential
customers and employees- both white and of color- to the establishment's
discriminatory preferences. 170 The Act also seeks to eliminate racial subterfuge
and tokenism. 17 1 In turn, revenues derived from license fees support black
businesses, provide black home buyers with no-interest mortgage loans, and
fund scholarships
for black students. 172 The Act thus replaces "idealism" with
"realism," 173 and "maximizes freedom of racial choice." 174
Bell's larger objective in telling this story is "to make people see." 175 The
analytic model encompassing textual, historical, and literary criticism and the act
of interpretation will assist our unfolding of what Bell wants readers to
comprehend.
Textual criticism, establishing the text to be interpreted, 176 illustrates that
the The Racial Preference Licensing Act chapter consists of both the story of the
President's signing of the Act 17 7 and a subsequent dialogue about the story
between the narrator (purportedly Bell) and his fictional interlocutor, the author
of the story, Geneva Crenshaw. 17 8 Although both parts are fictional, do we
consider them both part of the same fiction? While the commentary acts to
79
explicate the story, the poetic power of Bell's fictions arises more in the story. 1
Historical criticism helps the reader appreciate "the circumstances in which
and for which [the text] was written." 180 Knowledgeable readers of Bell's
corpus will verify that The Racial Preference Licensing Act crystallizes Bell's
long-held view that the civil rights approach to promoting integration was due to
fail-and has, in fact, failed. 18 1
Ultimately, literary criticism reveals the crux of our inquiry into Bell's

169. Id. at 47-48.

170. Id.
171. See id. at 48 (noting the requirement that discrimination be nonselective).
172. Id. at 48-49.
173. Id. at 49.
174. Id. at 52.
175. Id. at 60.
176. See PERRIN, supra note 56, at 2.
177. BELL, FACES AT THE BoTrOM, supra note 1, at 47-52.
178. Id. at 52-64. As apparent, some interesting issues of authorship arise here also. If the
story of the Act is by Crenshaw, does it really represent Bell's point of view? If a statement in the
dialogue, such as, "You have to make people see," see supra text accompanying note 175, is by
Crenshaw, does it in fact represent Bell's perspective? Do the narrator's? Since my purpose is
elsewhere, I shall elide these questions and generally read conclusory statements as Bell's.
179. See infra text accompanying notes 181-99, 210.
180. PERRIN, LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 56, at 4.
181. For example, the "Racial Preference Licensing Act" chapter appears in a book subtitled
The Permanenceof Racism. See BELL, FACES AT THE BoTToM, supra note 1.
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story. The narrative is a parable, a language event. 182 Bell transforms the
reader's understanding through the force of the story of the Act. 183 Like the
biblical parable, his story is metaphoric. Recall that metaphor causes "rifts" and
"disturbs and displaces" the existing order. 184 The story of the Racial License
Preferencing Act unsettles existing civil rights norms. Its attack on assumed
presuppositions and priorities shocks readers, including my own students.
Whereas the parable of the Good Samaritan required listeners to juxtapose two
entities-Samaritan and neighbor-they had thought contradictory,18 5 Bell's tale
urges readers to recognize as impossible of fulfillment something-integrationthey had taken as an unquestioned norm. In both parables, the challenge
18 6
operates as a reversal.
The disruption of existing norms provides the basis for the metaphoric
87
moment of creation-the productive event that transforms prior categories. 1
The story's call for "[r]acial realism"' 18 8 at once acknowledges the failure of an
integration model of civil rights and at the same time affirms the availability of
another approach. Market-driven economic analysis replaces the idealism of
moral advocacy.189 Endorsement of this law-and-economics approach provides
another level of reversal to the story, as law and economics is stereotypically
deemed to be conservative in its aims. 190 The story's theme is shocking; it has a
force that subsequent explication, whether here or in Bell's subsequent dialogue,
does not have. The metaphoric power of the message is not adequately
"conveyed by prosaic or discursive speech."' 19 1 Bell's dialogue on the Act
allows the reader to hold the theme at arm's length; however, that is not the case

182. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text.
183. Or the reader's understanding can be transformed if the reader is open to the story's
message. See infra text accompanying notes 272-84.
184. RICOEUR, RULE OF METAPHOR, supra note 91, at 22. See supra text accompanying note
92.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
186. See supra text accompanying note 55. In his other writings, Bell has characterized how
critical race theory disrupts prior reality. See Derrick Bell, Who's Afraid of CriticalRace Theory?,

1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 893, 899 [hereinafter Bell, Who's Afraid of CriticalRace Theory?]. Bell has
also characterized how narrative can affect listeners, "engendering seemingly irreconcilable
perceptions of societal attitudes." Bell, Power of Narrative, supra note 160, at 347 (quoting
Stephen Shie-Wei Fan, Immigration Law and the Promise of CriticalRace Theory: Opening the
Academy to the Voices ofAliens and Immigrants, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1202, 1216 (1997)).
187. See supra text accompanying note 104.
188. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 47.
189. See id. at 47, 51.
190. See generally ROBIN PAUL MALLOY, LAW AND ECONOMICS: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH
TO THEORY AND PRACTICE 51-56 (1990) (discussing criticisms of underlying assumptions and

values incorporated into the neoclassical economic model). Richard Delgado has also employed
law and economics for progressive purposes. See Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Roadmap: Is the
Marketplace Theory for EradicatingDiscriminationa Blind Alley?, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 215, 24445 (1998) (suggesting the use of market incentives to induce positive employer behavior toward
racial minorities).
191. FUNK, supra note 64, at 136 (discussing New Testament parable).
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in the story itself. The story has a poetic power: it breaks through the old and
opens new vistas. 192 Its method, like that of the New Testament parables, is
"reorientation by disorientation."' 193
In bringing forward something new, Bell's story must be assessed not based
on its adequation to old categories or norms 194 nor on verification, but on
"manifestation,i.e., letting what shows itself be." 19 5 The reader's primary task is
196
one of understanding, of opening oneself to the new world being disclosed.
The reader must try to live "in the aura of the meaning that is sought,"' 19 7 must
try to read with "imagination and sympathy."' 19 8 Critique is possible but only
first on the basis of understanding. Part of the force of the story of the Licensing
Act is that the reader's understanding remains uncertain: does Bell really intend
advocacy of the license, or is the story more rhetorical, more exhortative? 199
Because of its poetic power, the story seems to be parabolic. Further, there is
little evidence of allegorical overtones.
B. The Space Traders
As noted previously, 20 0 The Space Traders20 1 tells the story of alien visitors
to the United States who promise the country prosperity-wealth, environmental
decontaminants, and so on 2 2 -if in return the nation's people will allow the
space traders to transport home with them all of the country's blacks. 20 3 The
192. See supra text accompanying note 110.
193. See RICOEUR, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 71, at 244. Cf BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY,

supra note 159, at 161-62 (discussing how vanguard artists "create a new convention, sometimes
building on, but more often exceeding and threatening accepted conventions").
194. See RICOEUR, ESSAYS, supra note 66, at 36.
195. Id. at 102 (emphasis added).
196. See RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 137, at 177. See
infra text accompanying note 282.
197. RICOEUR, CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 135, at 298. See supra text
accompanying note 146.
198. LACOCQUE & RICOEUR, supra note 73, at xvii. See also supra text accompanying note
147.
199. The story's power may in fact be somewhat undercut by the succeeding dialogue, where
Geneva Crenshaw states that in fact her intention was to provoke and "'not... to urge actual
adoption of a racial preference licensing law."' BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 60.
Later she argues that even if traditional civil rights advocates resisted the Act, they still might have

their consciousness sufficiently raised by the story so that they might seek other new avenues for
reform. Id. at 62. Bell may have thought the dialogue's caveat necessary because, in Crenshaw's
words, "'I could not leave it to you to figure out the real significance of my story."' Id. at 52. If
read as intended literally, the Act's proposal might be deemed so oppositional to prior norms that it
would simply be rejected out of hand and its message for change dismissed. Crenshaw's
interjection that she needed to clarify the text's meaning reiterates the seeming symbiosis noted
earlier (see supra note 178) between the story and its expositor.
200. See supra text accompanying notes 1-3.
201. See BELL, FACES AT THE BoTroM, supra note 1, at 158-94. In his latest book, Bell
returns briefly to this narrative. See BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 159, at 47-48.
202. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 159-60.
203. Id. at 160.
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issue generates significant debate, and voters favor the trade decisively. 20 4 As in
The Racial License PreferencingAct, 20 5 this decision does not take place based
on what is right or moral.2 °6 Instead, despite the profound injustice, protection
of white self-interest prevails. As one black character in the story argues, "'[i]t
has become an unwritten tradition in this country for whites to sacrifice our
20 7
rights to further their own interests."'
Along with Bell's emphasis on racial realism, noted previously in the story
of the Licensing Act, 20 8 the theme of white self-interest is one of the most
perduring in Bell's corpus. 20 9 How does our interpretive method help us better
comprehend the story of The Space Traders? Analysis based on textual criticism
would be rather brief. The chapter in which the narrative appears includes only
the story; there is no accompanying explanatory dialogue, as there was in the
Licensing Act tale. 2 10 Historical criticism would seek to situate the tale within
not only its current history but also within the history to which it alludes. 2 11 The
story itself recounts prior consideration of emigration programs (voluntary and
involuntary) for African Americans. 2 12 It also briefly recalls the original
constitutional compromise that permitted slavery as a telling example of a
required sacrifice by blacks. 2 13 It evokes as well the American resettlement and
confinement of Japanese Americans during World War 11.214 Commentators
such as Michael Olivas have observed that the space trade is analogous to other
events in United States history: "Not only have Blacks been enslaved.., but
other racial groups have been conquered and removed, imported for their labor
and not allowed to participate in the society they built, or expelled when their
2 15
labor was no longer considered necessary."
204. Id. at 192.
205. See supra text accompanying note 188-89.
206. See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 171:
Golightly [a black character] had done what he so frequently criticized civil rights
spokespersons for doing: he had tried to get whites to do right by black people because
it was right that they do so. "Crazy!" he commented when civil rights people did it.
"Crazy!" he mumbled to himself, at himself
207. Id. at 174.
208. See supra text accompanying notes 188-89.
209. For more expansive discussion of these themes, see George H. Taylor, Racism as "The
Nation's Crucial Sin ": Theology and DerrickBell, 9 MICH. J. RACE & L. 269 (2004) [hereinafter
Taylor, Racism as "The Nation's CrucialSin "].
210. See supra text accompanying notes 177-81. The tale is later described as written by
Crenshaw. See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 195.
211. See PERRIN, LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra note 56, at 4.
212. See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 168 (citing schemes by Benjamin
Franklin and other abolitionists to free slaves and return them to Africa, and Lincoln's
investigation of emigration plans).
213. Id. at 188. Bell discusses this sacrifice at much greater length in another fictional
narrative, The Chronicleof the ConstitutionalContradiction. See BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED,
supra note 159, at 26-42.
214. See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 191.
215. Michael A. Olivas, The Chronicles, My Grandfather's Stories, and Immigration Law:
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To move from this historical criticism to literary criticism might seem to
deflect attention from the vision of the United States this history reflects, but that
is not the case. Rather, the move to literary criticism based on this history helps
illuminate the potency of the literary critical insight. Recognition of this history
could suggest to some that Bell's tale is fundamentally allegorical-a
recapitulation in fictional form of this historical trail of woe. If it is true, though,
that The Space Traders forces us to face this history, it does more than simply
challenge us to remember as our history a past we would rather forget. It
simultaneously asks us to confront the fact that this history operates in our
present and may presage our future. Essentially, the tale acts as a parable: it
reverses an assumed view of progress toward racial harmony and requires us to
face the role of white self-interest in our nation's decisions. The tale is
unsettling, disturbing, and upsetting, precisely to the extent it is not simply a
fictional fantasy. The allegorical elements in The Space Traders-its evocation
of the history analogous to the trade at issue in the story-add to the power of
the work as a parable.
C. Bluebeard's Castle
Bell's recounting of Bluebeard's Castle2 16 is distinctive. Instead of
presenting his own narrative creation, he uses a traditional French fairy tale (as
retold operatically by B61a Bart6k) to explore the "unkept promises" of
American racial justice. 2 17 Judith marries Bluebeard and upon entering his
castle sees seven locked doors. In order to more fully share his life, Judith asks
her husband to open the doors, but he initially refuses. 2 18 Over time, she gains
the keys from him one door at a time. To her horror, behind each door are
symbols of his malevolent reign: weapons of torture, armaments, gold, jewels,
and blood-stained scenes of his kingdom. 2 19 Bluebeard beseeches Judith not to
open the seventh and last door, but she does. Inside are his former wives, still
alive. Bluebeard gives her no choice but to join them, and the opera ends as he

The Slave Traders Chronicle as Racial History, 34 ST. Louis U. L.J. 425, 429 (1990). See also id.

at 430-39 (citing the removal of the Cherokee from Georgia, the importation of Chinese workers
followed by the Chinese Exclusion laws, and the importation of Mexican laborers under the
Bracero Program). Bell has acknowledged Olivas's work. See Bell, Power of Narrative,supra
note 160, at 345. See also Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Derrick Bell's Chronicle of the
Space Traders: Would the U.S. Sacrifice People of Color if the Price Were Right?, 62 U. COLO L.
REV. 312, 323-24 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, DerrickBell's Chronicle] (discussing
exploitation and subsequent displacement of Chinese and Mexican laborers and African American
slaves).
216. Bell, Bluebeard's Castle: An American Fairy Tale, in BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES,

supra note 159, at 155.
217. Id.

For a recording of the opera, see BtLA BART6K, BLUEBEARD'S CASTLE (Columbia

Records 1963).
218. Id. at 156.
219. BELL, AFROLANTICA

LEGACIES,

supra note 159, at 156.
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220
closes the door upon her.
Bell's exploration of the story is overtly allegorical. The first six doors
stand for episodes in the racial history of the United States where, in each, a
promising door was opened and then closed.
First, the Emancipation
Proclamation 2 2 1 freed slaves in Confederate territory, but it provided no
substantive rights that would prevent resubjugation. 2 22 Second, passage of the
post-Civil War constitutional amendments 2 23 suggested promise, but narrow
judicial construction rendered the protection basically meaningless. 2 24 Third,
the hopes of Brown2 25 have remained elusive.2 2 6 Fourth, the aims of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964227 to remediate racial discrimination in areas such as
employment have not been fulfilled. 22 8 Fifth, the Voting Rights Act of 1965229
led to thousands of new black voters, but in response, a variety of techniques
have been used to dilute the black vote. 2 30 Sixth, some affirmative action
policies have brought improvement, but resistance against them remains
strong. 23 1 Bell's allegory acknowledges that "change in the racial landscape"
has occurred.23 2 But the process is not one simply of ascending progress.
Instead, while doors do open, they also get closed.23 3
Bell's recourse to the tale of Bluebeard's Castle turns from allegory to
parable in the following two ways. First, the tale is not used merely as a vehicle
in which to explore the United States' racial history. Instead, the historical
recounting ultimately returns to the message of the story. As Bell relates,
Bluebeard responds to Judith's request that the castle be opened to outside wind,

220. Id. at 156-57.
221. Emancipation Proclamation, Proclamation No. 17 (Jan. 1, 1863), reprinted in 12 Stat.
1268
(1863),
and available at http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featureddocuments/

emancipation-proclamation/transcript.html.
222. BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIes, supra note 159, at 160-61.
223. U.S. CONST. amends. XIII (abolishing slavery in the U.S.), XIV (granting citizenship to
those born in the U.S.), and XV (prohibiting disenfranchisement on the basis of race).
224. BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 159, at 161-62.

225. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
226. BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 159, at 162 (describing the promise of racial
equality that Brown symbolized for many blacks).
227. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
228. BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 159, at 163.

229. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
230. BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 159, at 163-64.

231. Id. at 164. For Bell's more recent reflections on the Supreme Court's decisions in Gratz
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), and Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), which addressed
affirmative action in the educational context, see BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 159, at
147-59.
232. BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 159, at 165.

233. Id. ("Thus, despite breakthroughs, we find ourselves in the midst of an increasingly grim
national scene.").
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sun, and, light with this blunt retort: "Nothing can enlight this castle." 234 The
tale powerfully evokes the message: sun and light will not come; racism has its
permanence. 235 Bell comments: "The [racial] tableau changes with the times,
but its structure and final outcome remain constant." 236 As in Bell's other
narratives, the twist of the tale as applied to racial relations upsets our norms and
expectations. We presume a continuing path of progress in race relations, and
Bell jolts us, upsets us, and disorients us. As in the prior tales we have
discussed, the disorientation reorients us to a sober, chastened view of the
historic and present plight of the United States' racial minorities. In Bell's
return from an allegorical appropriation of the tale to the tale's own confounding
message, he transforms the literary character of the telling from allegory to
parable.
The second twist in Bell's use of the story goes further. It remains true that
"[n]othing can enlight this castle." 2 37 Yet, somehow, there is still room for
hope: a seventh door that remains yet to open-the door of the United States'
racial future.238 The metaphoric, "revelatory ' 239 power of the tale offers a
second level of reorientation.
The comparison of Bluebeard's tale with
American racial relations is an allegory, but the juxtaposition has poetic,
transformative power. And the contrast with the biblical parables, or with the
two prior fictions of Bell's that I have analyzed, is provocative. In all these, the
transformative power of the story occurred now, in the reading. In the language
event of the parable, 240 'Just so does the Kingdom of God break abruptly into
human consciousness.. ,,241 In The Racial Preference Licensing Act, 24 2 the
appeal to "[r]acial realism" 24 3 arises out of a transformed realization of the
situation in which we now find ourselves. The Space Traders244 pushes us to
confront the reality now of white self-interest. 24 5 By contrast, what is distinctive
234. Id. at 159.
235. This theme is an enduring one in Bell's work. Recall the subtitle of Bell's work Faces
at the Bottom of the Well: The Permanenceof Racism. See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTToM, supra
note 1.
236. BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 159, at 159-60.
237. Id. at 159.
238. Id. at 167 ("Behind it there is the potential for self-revelation for whites as well as
blacks. Salvation for all is possible if its light can reveal the destructiveness of whiteness, can
provide an antidote to its corrupting influence ... .
239. Id. at 155.
240. FUNK, supra note 64, at 220-21. See also PERRIN, LANGUAGE OF THE KINGDOM, supra

note 56, at 138, 146, 178 (describing how various scholars have analyzed parables as language
events).
241. CROSSAN, IN PARABLES, supra note 62, at 65. See also RICOEUR, FIGURING THE SACRED,

supra note 87, at 165 ("[T]he kingdom of God is not what the parables tell about, but what happens
in parables.").
242. BELL,FACES AT THE BoTroM, supra note 1, at 47.
243. Id.
244. Id. at 158.
245. Id. at 171.
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about the second level of the transformation offered in Bluebeard's Castle is that
it exists as something potential and possible, not something actual or present.
Bell writes:
America, too, has a Seventh Door. Behind it there is the potential for
self-revelation for whites as well as blacks. Salvation for all is possible
if its light can reveal the destructiveness of whiteness, can provide an
antidote to its corrupting influence, a corrective for its mesmerizing
hypnotic spell. The door will not be opened until blacks become
insistent or when political or economic conditions dictate this long246
overdue revelation.
As evident from the quotation, Bell does not discard his harsh critique. Change
will occur only when "blacks become insistent" (racial realism) or "when
political or economic conditions dictate" (white self-interest). But there is a door
and revelation can occur. Consistent with the histories of the prior doors, Bell is
not sanguine about how lasting the effects of the door's opening will be or
whether in fact the door will remain open. 247 But there is possibility
nonetheless. Bell's response here is consistent with his larger corpus. On the
one hand, racism is permanent; on the other, it remains worthwhile to fight the
struggle against it. As I argue elsewhere, this tension marks an enduring paradox
in Bell's work; however, as I also argue, it is a living paradox, not a
contradiction. 24 8
For present purposes, the literary insight is that the
transformative power of the parable as a narrative includes openness both to
249
what is and to what may be possible.
Bluebeard's Castle comprises one of Bell's "Afrolantica Legacies" in the
book of the same name. Afrolantica is a fictional creation of Bell's that first
appeared in the tale, The Afrolantica Awakening, a chapter in Faces at the
Bottom of the Well. 250
Afrolantica was a giant land mass that arose
unexpectedly in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. 25 1 Explorers to the land found
its special peculiarity: its air could be breathed by blacks but not whites. 2 52 In
fact, blacks venturing onto the land underwent an "experience of heightened self246. BELL, AFROLANTICA
247. Id. at 167-68.

LEGACIES,

supra note 159, at 167.

248. See Taylor, Racism as "The Nation's CrucialSin, "supra note 209.

249. This balance between the real and the aspirational is also an important theme in the work
of my colleague, Jules Lobel. Lobel writes:
Those who view justice not as a mere norm but as a turbulent river, "a fighting
challenge, a restless drive," are continually operating on the fault line between current
reality and human aspiration, between what is and what ought to be. Success in
navigating the river requires maintaining the tension between reality and aspiration,
between what is and what ought to be, between our reach and our grasp.
JULES LOBEL, SUCCESS WITHOUT VICTORY: LOST LEGAL BATTLES AND THE LONG ROAD TO JUSTICE
INAMERICA 9 (2003) (citations omitted).
250. See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 32-46.
251. Id. at 32-35.
252. Id. at 33-35.
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esteem, of liberation, of waking up." 2 53 Many blacks contemplated migrating to
Afrolantica's shores. When the first group of ships arrived, however, they were
met by the entire land mass sinking back into the ocean. 254 As the ships
retreated to return to the United States, the people on board discovered they were
not in fact dismayed. "[T]he miracle of Afrolantica was replaced by a greater
miracle. Blacks discovered that they themselves actually possessed the qualities
of liberation they had hoped to realize on their new homeland. Feeling this was,
they all agreed, an Afrolantica Awakening, a liberation-not of place, but of
, 255
mind."
As an Afrolantica legacy, Bluebeard's Castle intends to elicit a similar
liberation of mind-one of openness and possibility. In the concluding pages of
Afrolantica Legacies, Bell's fictional counterpart, Geneva Crenshaw, says to
narrator Bell that Afrolantica is real. Unlike the Camelots and Shangri-las,
which "[are all] envisioned as escapes from the real world," Afrolantica is "a
reflection of that world: one offering a perspective that enlightens and
encourages people wherever they are." 256 Bell's fictions are parables: they have
poetic power, they transform, they reorient by disorienting. They manifest both
what is-the realities now unfolded by critique-and the possibilities of what
may be. 257 What Bell ascribes to critical race theory in general applies directly
to his own work: it is "transformatively aspirational. ' 2 5 8
D. The Gospel Light
Bell's story, "The Gospel Light", 25 9 concludes his book Gospel Choirs and
provides an apt conclusion to the discussion of Bell's narratives. In this tale, the
narrator and his wife26 0 listen to Geneva Crenshaw preach a sermon during a
church service. The following story comprises the heart of Crenshaw's address.
261
Melodie is the daughter of a minister, and she has an exquisite singing voice.
253. Id. at 35.
254. Id. at 45.
255. Id. at 45-46.
256. BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 159, at 172.

257. See Derrick Bell, Commencement Address-Howard University School of Law, 38 How.
L.J. 463, 470 (1995) (arguing for communication of "a view of what is against a background of
what might be"). The openness to what may be is utopian, but this openness is utopian as
"exploration of the possible" rather than as escape, "the completely unrealizable." RICOEUR,
LECTURES, supra note 91, at 310. This clear-minded utopianism-utopianism in its best
function-has been visible in Bell's writings since his first work of fiction, And We Are Not Saved.
That book's final chapter calls for a "Third Way" between black emigration and violent struggle.
BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 159, at 251-58. Bell explicitly acknowledges that this
proposed alternative is "utopian," but he wants to carve out a space for a prospect that is as yet
"difficult even to envision." Id. at 255.
258. Bell, Who's Afraid of CriticalRace Theory?, supra note 186, at 906. Bell describes
critical race theory writing as embracing a "transformatively aspirational concern with race."
259. BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 159, at 203-14.
260. Id. at 214.
261. Id. at 207-8.
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Although her father and his church do not approve of gospel music, as she grows
older, Melodie finds that the gospels speak to her. 262 She decides upon the
ministry as a vocation, graduates from divinity school, and then serves in her
father's church.26 3 Upon her father's death, she submits her name for
consideration as the church's pastor. 264 The church is reluctant, both because
she is a woman and because its members prefer another candidate, who is
male. 2 65 The church nevertheless permits her to offer a trial sermon, and she
decides to preach in gospel hymns. 2 66 The sermon "should have opened all but
blinded eyes and sealed hearts," but blinded eyes and sealed hearts are what she
meets. 267 "Everyone was stunned by the beauty of her music, but determineddespite some inner turbulence-not to be moved by it." 2 68 The male candidate
is appointed as the new pastor instead. Later church records indicate that gospel
269
hymns have become congregation favorites.
The tale operates on several levels: on the role of women in employment
and in relationships, 2 70 on the abiding spiritual power-to which the book is
dedicated---of gospel songs, 2 7 1 and on the failure of listeners to hear. It is the
last theme that I want to emphasize here. At this level, the story is allegorical: a
tale about listeners' failure not only to hear the gospels but also to hear Bell
himself. The story is ultimately parabolic because it challenges our assumption
that we have heard. Bell asks us really to hear.

262. Id. at 208.
263. Id. at 208-9.
264. Id. at 211.
265. Id. The subtext here is that Melodie and the other candidate, Shadrach, have the
beginnings of a relationship, see id. at 209, and that Melodie knows that if she continues in the
competition, Shadrach will cease the relationship. See id. at 211.
266. Id. at 212-13.
267. Id. at 213.
268. Id.
269. Id. at 214.
270. Bell has thematized this subject in numerous narratives. See, e.g., Shadow Song, in
BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 159, at 91 (discussing and showing respect for issues of sexual
orientation); Women to the Rescue, in BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 159, at 152, 155
(discussing how "blacks must deal with sexism and patriarchy in our communities before we can
address effectively the continuing evils of racism"); The Entitlement, in BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS,
supra note 159, at 188 (discussing the fictional development of sexual entitlement therapy, which
precludes physical intimacy unless the relationship is based on equality and respect); The Last
Black Hero, in BELL, FACES AT THE BoTToM, supra note 1, at 65 (discussing interracial
relationships); The Race-ChargedRelationship of Black Men and Black Women: The Chronicleof
the Twenty-Seventh-Year Syndrome, in BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 159, at 198
(discussing the difficulty professional black women have in finding and establishing relationships
with black men).
271. See, e.g., BELL, GOSPEL CHOIRS, supra note 159, at 3-4 (describing the "spiritual
nourishment that is the essence of this music's appeal," an essence that has "a universality capable
of touching all who hear and need its comfort, its consolation," a potential "to touch and unite
across barriers of race and class").
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Although for Bell, a fundamental task is "to make people see," 272 he also
repeatedly acknowledges his awareness that people will refuse to see, refuse to
listen, refuse to understand. As in the parable of the Sower, his message is sown
on diversely receptive ground.27 3 At times Bell analogizes his efforts to the role
of a prophet. "About the least dire fate for a prophet is that one preaches, and no
one listens; that one risks all to speak the truth, and nobody cares. '"274 Elsewhere
he recurs to similar imagery. "The power of prophesy does not guarantee
conversion. Most people reject predictions founded in truth as unreasonable,
inconvenient, or frightening. That is why true prophets are more likely to be
persecuted than praised. ' 275 An essential part of the reason that Bell has
developed and argued for racial realism is that whites, because of self-interest,
have chosen not to listen to messages about the need for racial reform. Racial
realism replaces exhortation to do the right thing with economic analysis and
incentives. Recall Bell's words in his discussion of Bluebeard's Castle:
"[T]here is the potential for self-revelation for whites as well as blacks.... The
door will not be opened until blacks become insistent or when political or
economic conditions dictate this long-overdue revelation." 27 6 Bell's narratives
disrupt our categories, our orientation, our understanding in order to move us to
a place where the critique, through disorientation, opens us to paths of
reorientation. In an interview, Bell cites approvingly Audre Lorde's maxim that
one "can't destroy the master's house with the master's tools." 27 7 Bell's
fictional narratives travel a path alternative to the master's tools of doctrinal
legal analysis in order to disorient and reorient. As in Bluebeard's Castle,
though, he recognizes that, despite his efforts, readers may refuse to hear and the
door of possibility may, yet again, close. 27 8 Bell comments elsewhere, "The
presentation of truth in new forms provokes resistance, confounding those
committed to accepted measures for determining the quality and validity of
and making it difficult for them to
statements made and conclusions reached,
' 279
respond and adjudge what is acceptable."
When the door likely closes, for Bell the task is to take up the struggle once
again. 280 For the reader or listener, the primary charge is to understand one's
own obligation to hear. As parables, Bell's tales reorient and bring forth
272. BELL, FACES AT THE BoTroM, supra note 1, at 60.
273. See Mark 4:3-8.
274. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 157.
275. BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 159, at 33.
276. Id. at 167.
277. ANDREA McARDLE, An Interview with Derrick Bell: Reflections on Race, Crime, and
Legal Activism, in ZERO TOLERANCE 243, 249 (Andrea McArdle & Tanya Erzen eds., 2001)
(referring to Audre Lorde, The Master's Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master's House, in THis
BRIDGE CALLED MY BACK: WRITINGS BY RADICAL WOMEN OF COLOR 98, 99-100 (Cherrie Moraga
& Gloria Anzaldua eds., 1981)).
278. See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 159, at 167-68.
279. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 143.
280. See BELL, AFROLANTICA LEGACIES, supra note 159, at 174.
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something new. We cannot judge them according to familiar or conventional
criteria. In their poetic function, they incarnate "a concept of truth that escapes
the definition by adequation as well as the criteria of falsification and
verification. Here truth no longer means verification, but manifestation, i.e.,
letting what shows itself be." 28 1 To listen is first to understand, not to critique.
We must open ourselves to "the possible mode of being-in-the-world which the
text opens up and discloses." 282 For access to the meaning of a text, we must
read with "imagination and sympathy." 2 83 Bell can make manifest, can disorient
As
in order to reorient. But the reader or listener bears responsibility also. 2 84
Ricoeur writes, "This hearing which understands is the crux of our problem."
IV.
NARRATIVE

Based on our discussion of Bell's narratives as parables, we can now
resituate the debate on narrative in legal scholarship more generally. On the one
hand, understanding how parables manifest new insights allows us to ground
of legal narratives as "paradigm-shifting" 2 85 and
positive portrayals
"revelatory." 286 On the other hand, appreciation of the character of parables also
provides a response to critiques by scholars such as Farber and Sherry who argue
that narratives should be assessed according to "conventional standards of
' 2 87
truthfulness and typicality."
I contend that Farber and Sherry comprehend truthfulness and typicality on
the basis of adequation to existing norms, whereas narrative as reorientation by
disorientation acts based on the manifestation of new norms and new truths. 2 88 I
shall argue that the criterion of typicality should be incorporated into the
criterion of truthfulness; first, however, I move toward that point by discussing
some of the limitations of typicality on its own terms. For our purposes,
recourse to typicality fails on at least two grounds. First, sometimes the injury or
story may not be "typical" in the sense of one that happens to the majority of a
class-think of racial lynching, for instance-yet it is one that deserves attention
and redress on its own and may, as well, reflect deeper, more "typical" racial
animosity. The story is both an individual story and a deeper, broader story.
Further, typicality does not adequately encompass the stories of those who see
more deeply. Think, for example, of the role of the religious prophet in Western

281. RICOEUR, ESSAYS, supra note 66, at 102.
282. RICOEUR, HERMENEUTICS AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 137, at 177.

283. LACOCQUE & RICOEUR, supra note 73, at xvii.
284. RICOEUR, CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 135, at 450.

285. Abrams, The Narrative and the Normative, supra note 15, at 50.
286. Abrams, Unity, Narrative,andLaw, supra note 17, at 5.

287. Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School, supra note 18, at 854.
288. For another provocative criticism of Farber and Sherry, see Jane B. Baron, Resistance to
Stories, 67 S. CAL. L. REv. 255 (1994).
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tradition-an analogy drawn by Be1 2 89-- or of Plato's allegory of the cave in the
Republic.291 In both, truth lies in what is seen, not in its being acknowledged as
typical. For someone like Bell, the truth of his work should not depend on it
being judged as typical, for its "typicality"-the pervasiveness of the racial
injustice that he intends to describe-is acknowledged only if we first
understand (i.e., have manifested in us) its underlying truth.2 9 1
So the question becomes whether the "truth" of Bell's or any narrative acts
reorient
by disorientation. Farber and Sherry raise the issue here as one of the
to
"veracity and verifiability" of a story. 2 92 Recall, though, Ricoeur's criticisms of
this approach. Analysis has been so "heavily determined by the history of the
principles of verification and falsification" that it has become difficult for the
standard approach "to conceive of a concept of truth that would not be taken for
granted and defined a priori as adequation.'"293 By contrast, Ricoeur wants to
articulate and defend another approach to truth, one that "escapes the definition
by adequation as well as the criteria of falsification and verification. Here truth
no longer means verification, but manifestation, i.e., letting what shows itself
29 5be." 294 For narrative-and in particular, as I have argued, Bell's narratives
2 96
truth is measured as manifestation, not adequation.
Certainly, a criterion of truth as manifestation presents problems. As Farber
and Sherry anticipate, it is difficult to know how to appraise a criterion that
seems to rely on an intuitive "flash of recognition" and that may be susceptible
29 7
to a reader's reaffirmation of his or her own preconceptions or biases.
Ricoeur himself acknowledges some circularity in understanding: to understand
one must "live in the aura of the meaning that is sought." 2 98 There is also some
circularity between understanding and critique. Critique is possible, but only

289. See supra text accompanying notes 274-75. Jules Lobel also distinguishes between the
prophetic and the current, majoritarian view.

According to Lobel, the value of prophecy is

determined not by success according to current norms but by transformation in the long-term. See
LOBEL, supra note 249, at 106-7, 116.
290. PLATO, Republic, in THE COLLECTED DIALOGUES OF PLATO 575, 747-50 (Edith Hamilton

& Huntington Cairns eds., Paul Shorey trans., 1961).
291. As throughout, the analogy here to the prophets and to Plato, as earlier to Jesus's
parables, is not to equate Bell's status with these figures but to indicate a methodological similarity
in how truth is disclosed.
292. FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7, at 99.
293. RICOEuR, FIGURING THE SACRED, supra note 87, at 36 (referring specifically to linguistic

analysis).
294. RICOEUR, ESSAYS, supra note 66, at 102.
295. See supra Part III.
296. Kathryn Abrams argues that narratives "offer new understandings of what 'truth' as a
criterion for belief might be... [and] challenge the notion that 'truth' must be established by
comparison with an external point of reference," that is, by adequation to given, external norms.
Abrams, Unity, Narrativeand Law, supra note 17, at 22.
297. Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School, supra note 18, at 836-37.
298. RICOEUR, CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 135, at 298.
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after "reading and interpretation through imagination and sympathy." 29 9 This
circularity is undeniably frustrating for parties on both sides: for those narrators
who maintain they are not understood because the reader has not, in the
narrators' view, sufficiently opened themselves to the story being told, and 30
for0
those who criticize the story and are, in turn, criticized for not understanding.
Stories assisted by internal or supplementary analysis-the dialogues, for
example, following many of Bell's narratives between Bell and the fictional
Geneva Crenshaw--can provide some common grounds of analysis for both
narrator and reader. 30 1 But the primacy of manifestation remains. A new truth,
it is contended, is being told, and this new truth may reorient by disorientation,
by unsettling existing norms, existing truths. To really understand, one must
really listen.
To reject manifestation because of its methodological uncertainties is to
reject the possibility of new truths that have yet to be disclosed. It is difficult to
comprehend, for example, how Farber and Sherry's interpretive model can accommodate itself to the possibility of manifestation rather than only to
adequation. In turn, this raises questions about the adequacy of their interpretive
approach. Farber and Sherry endorse a model of legal pragmatism.3 °2 Legal
pragmatism is not formalist in its reasoning and allows for a range of cognitive
tools to be employed in reaching a judgment. 30 3 The Farber and Sherry form of
pragmatism is conservative 30 4 in the descriptive sense in that it relies
considerably on the weight of tradition. As Farber writes separately:
The pragmatist philosophers were keenly sensitive to the importance of
tradition... as a necessary ingredient in all human reasoning. For the
pragmatists, tradition was... the essential foundation for intellectual
and social progress. Consistency with the past is, as Holmes said, as
much a necessity as a virtue, for "[t]he past gives us our vocabulary and
fixes the limits of our imagination."... [C]reativity and innovation do

299. LACOCQUE & RICOEUR, supra note 73, at xvii.
300. See, e.g., Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School, supra note 18, at 851 ("[Flor
those readers who neither resonate nor recognize, and for those who passionately disagree [with a
story], there is no way to enter the dialogue.").
301. Farber and Sherry have argued that many narratives do not contain analytic elements but
are simply stories. See, e.g., FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7, at 86, 99;
Farber & Sherry, Telling Stories Out of School, supra note 18, at 809. Richard Delgado has
strongly criticized this argument, offering Bell's work as an exemplary example of the more
typical critical race narrative. See Delgado, On Telling Stories,supra note 18, at 670.
302. See FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7, at 132-33.
303. See id. See also Daniel A. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis: Legal Pragmatismfor the
Twenty-First Century, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 163, 169 [hereinafter Farber, Reinventing Brandeis]

("The pragmatist's judicial decision will rarely claim to rest on a single premise. Rather than using
the metaphor of the foundation as a means of support, pragmatists prefer to speak of a web of
beliefs or a many-legged stool.").
304. See Eskridge, supra note 16, at 612-13 (characterizing Farber and Sherry's approach as
"conservative pragmatism").
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not arise from a rejection of tradition but rather from a full embrace of
it ....

305

Setting aside the question of the accuracy of this characterization of pragmatist
approaches, Farber's statement reveals much about the methodology that he and
Sherry adopt. Consider again this statement from the longer quotation:
"Consistency with the past is . as much a necessity as a virtue, for '[t]he past
gives us our vocabulary and fixes the limits of our imagination."' 30 6 This is a
methodology of adequation, and it is an approach that a methodology open to
manifestation rejects as insufficient. Compare Ricoeur's definition of tradition.
Tradition is
not the inert transmission of some already dead deposit of material but
the living transmission of an innovation always capable of being
reactivated by a return to the most creative moments of poetic
is constituted by the interplay of
activity.... In fact, a tradition
30 7
sedimentation.
and
innovation
This definition of tradition can be contextualized within the larger
dimensions of hermeneutics, to whose development Ricoeur and Hans-Georg
Gadamer are the principal contemporary contributors. In my view, hermeneutics
provides the broad interpretive domain within which narratives such as Bell's
and, more generally, the poetic and the parable may be located, typically at the
more disruptive end of the spectrum. Hermeneutics argues that understanding
does not arise simply based on applying what has come before (a sedimentary
notion of tradition) to the instance at hand (the story being told or the legal case
at issue). Instead, the pre-existing whole (the tradition, the existing norm of
understanding) is informed by the part (the instance of application), and
understanding of the part is informed by the whole--each informs the other. As
Gadamer argues, application involves "co-determining, supplementing, and
correcting [a] principle." 30 8 Commentator Joel Weinsheimer explains that this
means that neither the interpretive rule "nor the instance to which it is applied is
antecedent to the other;" their relationship is "reciprocal rather than unilateral.
Each term modifies and acts on the other so that they interact." 30 9 The particular
is not assessed in terms of its adequation to existing norms, for these norms may

305. Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution, 72 MINN. L. REV. 1331,

1344-45 (1988) [hereinafter Farber, Legal Pragmatism] (quoting OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES,
COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 139 (1920) and citing JOHN DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE 265 (1934)).
306. Id. (citation omitted).
307. 1 PAUL RJCOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE 68 (Kathleen McLaughlin & David Pellauer
trans., Univ. Chi. Press 1984) (1983) [hereinafter 1 RiCOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE].
308. GADAMER, supra note 136, at 39.
309. JOEL WEINSHEIMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS AND LITERARY THEORY 80 (1991)
See also JOEL WEINSHEIMER,
[hereinafter WEINSHEIMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS].
GADAMER'S HERMENEUTICS: A READING OF TRUTH AND METHOD 192 (1985) ("[T]he general is...
continually determined by the particular, even as it determines the particular. Application is not
reductive but productive ... ").
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be informed and transformed by the incorporation of the particular. Something
new is seen, and that recasts the previously existing whole.
Frank Michelman discusses similarly the notion of practical reason.
"Judgment mediates between the general standard and the specific case .... This
process, in which the meaning of the rule emerges, develops, and changes in the
course of applying it to cases is one that every common law practitioner will
immediately recognize." 3 10 The hermeneutic process of application is not
extreme or extraordinary, but part of everyday interpretation.
Existing

interpretive norms are reassessed and reintegrated as part of the routine process
of application to new situations. It is insufficient to rest application on an
adequation to prior norms and rules. In the process of application, something
new occurs, something new is made manifest, and that truth must be

incorporated into a recast set of norms. In the typical process of application, as
in typical common law development, the new that appears may be slightly
311
different from the old and change may be very incremental.
But the major disruptive power of the narrative, as of the poetic and the
parable, is simply a more extreme version of the same process. 3 12 It may be
troubling that there is no more formal or uniform way to resolve the relationship

between the general and the particular at the moment of application; different
interpreters will resolve the interrelation in different ways. But that is the reality
with which we are faced. Denial of the truth that a new manifestation may bring
leaves us very partial and limited in our understanding.

310. Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 2829 (1986).
311. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 16, at 630 (affirming the pragmatist view that opinions
are dynamic and undergo cumulative changes over time).
312. Perhaps this interrelation of the relatively modest process of application with the
disruptive and reorientative process of the poetic or the parable may help overcome objections to
the notion of manifestation. One criticism of manifestation is that some claim ignorance of
"'[d]isclosure' as an 'event' in 'understanding'. They say that this is not their model for what it is
to understand ....
" Frei, "LiteralReading", supra note 127, at 55 (endorsing this position). The
minute occurrences of disclosure in the moment of application may make more credible the
possibility of larger "events" in the poetic moment. Another criticism, voiced by Farber and
Sherry, is that reports of "conversion" based on a story are "scarce." Farber & Sherry, Telling
Stories Out of School, supra note 18, at 826. Perhaps, though, repeated exposure to a message in
stories can slowly bring a reader to a changed orientation. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 16, at
630. It is a different point if a reader refuses to change positions. See supra text accompanying
notes 125-27.
On other grounds, Mark Tushnet claims that Bell's narratives fail because "our society lacks a
similar set of shared assumptions." Because of societal diversity, different readers will react to
Bell in different ways. Mark Tushnet, The Degradationof ConstitutionalDiscourse, 81 GEO. L.J.
251, 274 (1992). Again the response would be that in the moment of application, readers are asked
to challenge their existing assumptions and to revise them as a result of their encounter with the
new truths that Bell claims to expose. Whether in fact this will occur is the distinguishable issue of
the nature of reader response. However, methodologically, it is not sufficient for Tushnet simply
to observe differing assumptions as a starting point. The question is whether the narrative can help
overcome these differences.
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Farber himself quotes positively Michelman's statement. 3 13 Farber's work
also includes assertions that pragmatism "can encompass both tradition and
prophecy." 3 14 However, it is difficult to find-whether in Farber's own work or
the work he has coauthored with Sherry-incorporation of the role that
manifestation of the new may play. Their work more centrally seems predicated
on Farber's phrase, "[c]onsistency with the past is... as much a necessity as a
virtue, for 'It]he past gives us our vocabulary and fixes the limits of our
imagination."' 3 15 Emphasis on adequation alone does not allow for
manifestation. But there is more than one kind of reason, 3 16 and more than one
approach to discovering the truth.3 17 Farber and Sherry quote Brandeis: "'If we
would guide by the light of reason, we must let our minds be bold."' 3 18 The
lesson, they immediately add, is that "[t]hose of us in the mainstream must
remain open-minded; we must not be afraid to learn from others." 3 19 This does
not seem a lesson that Farber and Sherry have adequately incorporated. Recall
Ricoeur's phrase: "This hearing which understands is the crux of our
narrative problem is the failure to hear that leads to
problem." 320 The crux of32the
1
the failure to understand.
313. Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of PracticalReason: Statutes, Formalism, and the
Rule of Law, 45 VAND. L. REv. 533, 538 (1992).
314. Farber, Reinventing Brandeis, supra note 303, at 181.
315. Farber, Legal Pragmatism,supra note 305, at 1344-45 (citation omitted).
316. See Francis J. Mootz III, Between Truth and Provocation: Reclaiming Reason in
American Legal Scholarship, 10 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 605 (1998) (reviewing FARBER & SHERRY,
BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7).

317. Essential to Farber and Sherry's project is a defense of the Enlightenment. See, e.g.,
FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7, at 27 ("At least since the Enlightenment,

knowledge has been thought of as universally accessible and objective."). One way to view the
contest between advocates of narrative and Farber and Sherry is by comparison to a similar debate
within the Western tradition between the Enlightenment and its antagonist, Romanticism.
Consider Isaiah Berlin's depiction of the two. See ISAIAH BERLIN, THE ROOTS OF ROMANTICISM

(Henry Hardy ed., 1999). The use of symbol was central to romantic thought because of its
attention to dimensions of depth. Id. at 99, 102. Romanticism tried to express symbolically what
"could not be expressed literally." Id. at 100. The effort was to convey something "immaterial"
using "material" means. Id. at 102. "Whatever description I give always opens the doors to
something further,.. . but certainly something which is in principle incapable of being reduced to
precise clear, verifiable, objective prose." Id.at 103. The romantic stance was dramatically
distinguishable from the Enlightenment's appeal to a knowable, objective truth. Id. at 105.
318. FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7, at 142 (quoting New State Ice
Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,dissenting)). Farber also quotes this
passage in the final sentence of his more lengthy essay on Brandeis. See Farber, Reinventing
Brandeis,supra note 303, at 190.
319. FARBER & SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON, supra note 7, at 142. See also id. at 107
(noting the "personal qualities that a search for truth reflects-such as open-mindedness, humility,
[and] tolerance ... ')(quoting William P. Marshall, In Defense of the Searchfor Truth as a First
Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REv. 1, 31 (1995)).
320. RICOEUR, CONFLICT OF INTERPRETATIONS, supra note 135, at 450.
321. Cognitive psychologist Howard Gardner writes:
Unless one is committed to religious fundamentalism, one should always remain open
to changing one's mind; it is worth attending to ideas that have affected many others,

Reprinted with the Permission of New York University School of Law

2007]

DERRICK BELL'S NARRATIVES AS PARABLES
V.
NARRATIVE AS IDEALISTIC?

After having explicated and situated Bell's narratives on their own terms, it
is now appropriate, in this final Part, to enlarge the frame of reference and return
to the question raised by Richard Delgado. Is the employment of narrative to
challenge racism too idealistic, too focused on mental constructs, when the task
should instead be concentration on the material factors that more decisively
effect change? 32 2 Recall that Delgado offers Bell's thesis of "interestconvergence ' 32 3 as an exemplar of a materialist approach: racial change has
occurred in the United States not because of white morality but because of white
self-interest, including fears of social unrest and adverse international
standing. 32 4 Change has resulted not from persuasion but from material
conditions. Let me offer another, related example. Bell argues that racism's
perdurance stems from whites' maintenance of a property right in whiteness.
"[T]he set of assumptions, privileges, and benefits that accompany the status of
being white can become a valuable asset that whites seek to protect." 325 The
3 26
advantages are again material: economic, political, and psychological.
Yet in helping us assess the difference between materialism and idealism,
the theme of a property right in whiteness raises two provocative points. First,
for whites low on the economic ladder, maintenance of this property right may
be contrary to their economic interests. They identify with whites at the
economic top rather than ally with blacks of an economic class similar to their
own; in fact, they blame blacks of their economic class for being the source of
their problem. 32 7 These whites act against their own best economic interests. A
material interest-here the property right in whiteness-is not necessarily
equivalent to an economic interest. Second, this material interest is founded in a

even when one personally finds little of value in them. Our thought processes sharpen
when we wrestle with these ideas, and it is even possible that we might eventually find
merit in the ideas that we once rejected .... [Aiwareness of resistance is valuable both
to the creator of new vision and to the individual who initially resists a strange and
exotic presentation-possibly because it hits too close to home.
GARDNER, supra note 125, at 127.

322. Delgado, Crossroads,supra note 9, at 123-24.
323. See, e.g., Bell, Interest-Convergence Dilemma, supra note 47, at 522-28 (explaining
Brown in terms of the temporary convergence of interests among blacks and (some) whites).
324. Delgado, Crossroads,supra note 9, at 137-38. For prior discussion of Bell's theme of
white self-interest, see supra text accompanying notes 206-09.
325. Derrick A. Bell, DerrickA. Bell (dissenting), in WHAT BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION
SHOULD HAVE SAID: THE NATION'S Top LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA'S LANDMARK CIVIL
RIGHTS DECISION 185, 188 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).

326. Id. at 185.
327. Derrick Bell, Racism: A Major Source of Propertyand Wealth Inequality in America, 34

IND. L. REV. 1261, 1270-71 (2001).

As Bell recognizes, this result is contrary to his interest

convergence thesis. See, e.g., BELL, AND WE ARE NOT SAVED, supra note 159, at 165.
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on biology 328
cognitive structure. The status ascribed to whiteness is based not
32 9
but on belief, a belief supported and confirmed in white culture.
To generalize the point, part of the essential scholarly contribution of Bell
and Delgado is that they argue against and seek to replace inadequate, current
cognitive models of racial change. In Bell's view, the traditional civil rights
community's assumption that racism would be progressively eradicated has
33 1
failed. 3 30 As we saw in discussion of The Racial PreferenceLicensing Act,
Bell argues that the fight against racism should rely less on the "idealism" of
ethics and more on the "racial realism" of economics. 332 Bell's realism wants to
oust idealism, but racial realism is itself a cognitive model that intends to
supplant another, failed cognitive model. Delgado and Stefancic in turn describe
as an "empathic fallacy" 3 33 the belief that idealist forms such as speech and
dialogue will lead to changes in individuals' minds. 334 Why do these vehicles
fail? As argued above, we are not autonomous entities who choose among
competing ideas.
In an important sense, we are our current stock of narratives, and they
us. We subscribe to a stock of explanatory scripts, plots, narratives, and
understandings that enable us to make sense of-to construct-our
social world. Because we then live in that world, it begins to shape and
we see, how we select, reject, interpret
determine us, who we are, what
33 5
and order subsequent reality.
Racism is itself part of the "dominant narrative" that comprises the
understandings on the basis of which we reason, and these dominant narratives
resist change. 3 36 In its reliance on dialogue and exhortation to effect change, the
empathic fallacy is too idealistic. Note, though, that like Bell, Delgado and
Stefancic challenge idealism based on an alternative cognitive structure. "[W]e

328. Yes, some still may believe the difference is biological, but that is not the case for most.
329. In his latest book, Bell cites as a principle here the notion of "hegemony": a belief,
reinforced by the social structure, in the value of the current social order. See BELL, SILENT
COVENANTS, supra note 159, at 187. As noted above, supra text accompanying note 326,
whiteness can have economic, political, and psychological value, but that value results from a
status that exists in the head, not in biological reality. As the text now goes on to argue, cultural
status is a cognitive phenomenon that has real, empirical consequences.
330. Derrick Bell, Racial Realism, 24 CONN. L. REV. 363, 377-78 (1992).
331. See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 47-64. See also supra Part III.A.
332. See BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 49.
333. See supra text accompanying note 50.
334. See Delgado & Stefancic, Images of the Outsider,supra note 50, at 1261, 1276, 1281.
335. Id. at 1280. Among those cited in support at the end of this quotation, see id. at 1280
n.166, are the first two volumes of Ricoeur's Time and Narrative. See 1 RICOEUR, TIME AND
NARRATIVE, supra note 307, & 2 PAuL RICOEUR, TIME AND NARRATIVE (Kathleen McLaughlin &
David Pellauer trans., Univ. Chi. Press 1985) (1984). I agree that Ricoeur says we are structured
by our narratives. However, I will later argue that for Ricoeur these narratives can change, as in

metaphoric moments. See infra text accompanying notes 363-65.
336. Delgado & Stefancic, Images of the Outsider,supra note 50, at 1279.
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are our current stock of narratives.... " 337 As they write elsewhere, "The
devices by which we construct and make sense of our social world are largely
3 38
linguistic, consisting of categories, concepts, and particularly narratives."
Cognitive structures themselves have a materiality; inextricably they provide a
framework, an interpretive density, through which and because of which we
understand. 3 39 The civil rights community's material actions-dedicated labors
of untold years-may not achieve the desired goal if they are pursued according
to an insufficient cognitive understanding of racism's modality. At times,
Delgado writes, a "gestalt switch" may be necessary. 340 We may need "to
examine the legal background-the bundle of assumptions, baselines,
presuppositions, and received wisdoms-against which the familiar interpretive
work of courts and legislatures takes place." 34 1 If we fail at this cognitive task,
"all the rest is shadowboxing."342 Delgado argues that the search must be
undertaken both for the "broad structures" that have led to racial and other forms
of oppression and for those that may replace them with true equality and
democracy. 34 3 Cognitive structures should be included within both of these
lists.

34 4

337. Id. at 1280 (second emphasis added).
338. Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Norms and Narratives: Can Judges Avoid Serious
Moral Error?, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1929, 1957 (1991) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Norms and
Narratives]. See also id. at 1953 ("[W]e are all situated actors, constituted in large part by the
'stories' or narratives by which we understand and impose order on reality.").
339. For example, Bell describes how at the time Brown v. Board ofEducation, 347 U.S. 483
(1954), was being decided, segregation was not simply aberrant. Rather, he writes, "[i]t was the
dominant interpretiveframework for a social structure that organizes the American garden's very
configuration. Segregation... consolidated the imaginative lens through which Americans would
now conceive race." BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 159, at 82 (emphasis added).
Paul Ricoeur pursues the larger argument here at greater length. In contrast to the Marxist
division between an economic infrastructure and superstructure of ideas, Ricoeur argues that
concepts themselves inform and are part of the infrastructure. RICOEUR, LECTURES, supra note 91,
at 223.
340. Delgado, Shadowboxing, supra note 18, at 823.
341. Id. at 823-24.
342. Id. at 824.
343. Delgado, Two Ways, supra note 4 1, at 2296.
344. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell's Toolkit-Fit to Dismantle That Famous
House?, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 283, 307 (2000) ("Sometimes... one needs to turn a thought structure
on its side, look at it from a different angle, and gain some needed distance from it, before the path
to liberation becomes clear."); Delgado, Brewer's Plea, supra note 30, at 6 ("We needed new ideas
and theories-sometimes if you are up a tree and a flood is coming, you have to climb down
before climbing up a taller one."); Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same
Stories?: Law Reform, Critical Librarianship,and the Triple Helix Dilemma, 42 STAN. L. REV.
207, 223 (1989) [hereinafter Delgado & Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories?] ("[The
ideas of] divergent individuals [such as Bell] offer the possibility of legal transformation and
growth. Like nature's mutant or hybrid, they offer the infusion of new material needed to retain
the vitality of our system of thought.").
The present Article is likewise an attempt to displace a prevalent conceptual structure (one
defining understanding on the basis of its adequation to existing norms) with a new conceptual
structure (one expanding understanding to allow manifestation of the new). Both of these
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If cognitive structures have a materiality, then what becomes of Delgado's
distinction between idealist and materialist forms of racial critique? The
distinction remains vital on two grounds. First, Delgado argues that recent racial
critique has been disproportionately idealist. Critique has focused "almost
exclusively on discourse at the expense of' attention to issues such as power,
history, and other social, political, and economic determinants of racial
fortune. 34 5 "Ideal factors-thoughts, discourse, stereotypes, feelings, and mental
categories-only partially explain how race and racism work. Material factorssocioeconomic competition, immigration pressures, the search for profits,
changes in the labor pool, nativism-account for even more, especially
today." 34 6 Delgado seeks to redress an imbalance. At this level, both idealist
and materialist analyses can coexist, and Delgado's encouragement of a
materialist perspective does not undermine the space for an account (such as this
Article's) that emphasizes discourse analysis. In turn, the present Article's
concentration on cognitive structures rather than on questions of power or
history does not intend to denigrate work in these other areas. 34 7 To be more
precise, this Article addresses the need for acknowledgment of cognitive
structures that allow entrance of Bell's disruptive arguments-arguments that
advance theses about very material subjects such as interest convergence and
whiteness as property.
At a second level, however, Delgado's endorsement of materialist over
idealist approaches is more challenging. The claim is that recourse to materialist
analysis is necessary as a matter of efficacy: materialist factors create change;
idealist factors largely do not. Change occurs on the basis of social, political,
and economic movements, not on the basis of narrative. Recall Delgado and
Stefancic's coining of the empathic fallacy: we are constituted by our stories,
and later discourse-the introduction of new narratives-will not move us, will

conceptual structures have a materiality; they provide an interpretive lens through which data is
assessed, explained, and understood.
345. Delgado, Crossroads, supra note 9, at 122.
346. Delgado, Two Ways, supra note 41, at 2280. See also Delgado, Crossroads,supra note
9, at 123-24.
347. The brevity of these remarks on the importance of this material work might seem a form
of academic genuflection: a brief, honorific show of purported respect, while true interest really
lies elsewhere. Let me suggest why that suspicion is, I hope, mistaken in the present case. The
time I spent as a boycott organizer in Los Angeles for Cesar Chavez's United Farm Workers left a
lasting impression about the relationship between organizing and legal rights. Legal discourse,
including legal rights, does not arise and is not maintained without organizing, without expression
of political power. In the legal literature, this relationship is especially well articulated in the work
of Staughton Lynd. See, e.g., Staughton Lynd, The Right to Engage in Concerted Activity After
Union Recognition: A Study of Legislative History, 50 IND. L.J. 720 (1975). William Eskridge
endorses a similar recognition in the gay and lesbian movement. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note
16, at 632 (citing the views of Franklin Kameny that "information and persuasion will be
unavailing unless backed up by power and protest"). The present Article's attention to cognitive
understanding assesses therefore only one aspect of a much larger picture.
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348
not create fundamental change.

We are all situated actors, whose selves, imaginations, and range of
possibilities are constructed by our social setting and experience. We
are, in a sense, our current narratives. Thus, an unfamiliar narrative
invariably generates resistance; despite our best efforts, counterstories
are likely9 to effect at most small, incremental changes in the listener or
reader.

34

Under this critique, even if this article is successful is establishing that uses of
narratives such as Bell's make manifest something new and so cannot be
evaluated according to existing norms of adequation, this thesis seemingly has
more theoretical than actual import because narratives that seek to transformincluding Bell's-will continue not to persuade. As we have discussed
throughout, readers will resist the narrative.
In the face of Delgado's challenge, does my thesis about the nature of Bell's
narrative have any remaining heft, any actual import? Let me answer by trying
to respond to the most pointed question raised by Delgado's critique: why do
Delgado and Bell, materialists both, continue to write? The response itself has
four differentiable levels. First, writing can take the form of truth-telling,
whether it is efficacious or not. This element is more overt in Bell's work. Bell
writes, for instance, "[w]e're a race of Jeremiahs, prophets calling for the nation
to repent." 350 As previously noted,35 1 Bell goes on to acknowledge, "[a]bout the
least dire fate for a prophet is that one preaches, and no one listens; that one risks
all to speak the truth, and nobody cares." 352 Truth-telling voices objection and
protest; it does not let those living falsely to go free, even where it does not
change minds. 353 Speaking the truth also can provide the writer some sense of
348. As Delgado and Stefancic note,
[T]he empathic fallacy[] consists of believing that we can enlarge our sympathies
through linguistic means alone. By exposing ourselves to ennobling narratives, we
broaden our experience, deepen our empathy, and achieve new levels of sensitivity and
fellow-feeling. We can, in short, think, talk, read, and write our way out of bigotry and
narrow-mindedness, out of our limitations of experience and perspective....
[H]owever, we can do this only to a very limited extent.
Delgado & Stefancic, Images of the Outsider,supra note 50, at 1261.
349. Delgado & Stefancic, Norms and Narratives, supra note 338, at 1933. As Delgado
notes in another work,
[Miost audiences will generally react to the reformer's message with either anger or
puzzlement. Members of the control group will be angry: How dare they use that
argument against us? And persons not members of either the insurgent or the control
group will respond with puzzlement: I thought they meant the [status quo] by justice.
Delgado, Norms and Normal Science: Toward a Critique of Normativity in Legal Thought, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 933, 961 (1991).
350. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTToM, supra note 1, at 157.
351. Supra text accompanying note 274.
352. BELL, FACES AT THE BOTTOM, supra note 1, at 157.
353. See, e.g., Delgado & Stefancic, Derrick Bell's Chronicle, supra note 215, at 328
("[S]torytellers have directed their attention to the oppressors, reminding them of a day when they
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integrity, of refusal to acquiesce. 3 54 Second, even where the narrative does not
change the minds of a racial majority, it can act as a counterstory supporting the
story of racial minorities-it tells the truth of their story. 355 The value of story
for these communities must be underscored. Third, the counterstory urges that
the majoritarian story is neither the only story nor a necessary story. The current
social system is not a closed system, and alternatives exist. Delgado writes that
counterstories "can open new windows into reality, showing us that there are
possibilities for life other than the ones we live. They enrich imagination and
teach that by combining elements from the story and current reality, we may
construct a new world richer than either alone." 3 56 As we have discussed, this
notion of possibility is an essential element of Bell's writings, most notably in
his narrative, Bluebeard's Castle.3 57 The work of Delgado and Bell is
"transformatively aspirational. 3 5 8
These three levels of response remain independent of the challenge Delgado
raises at a fourth and final level: does critical race narrative change the
perspective of those in the white majority? First, let us enlarge the question: can
minds change? Cognitive psychology suggests the answer is yes. In a recent
work, Howard Gardner argues:
[M]ost mental representations are neither given at birth nor frozen at the
time of their adoption. In our terms, they are constructed over time
within our minds/brains and they can be reformed, refashioned,
reconstructed, combined, altered, and undermined. They are, in short,
within our hands and within our minds. Mental representations are not
immutable; analysts or reflective individuals are able to lay them out,
and, while altering representations may not be easy, changes can be
35 9
effected.

would be called to account.").
354. See, e.g., BELL, CONFRONTING AUTHORITY, supra note 159, at 161.
355. See Delgado, DerrickBell's Racial Realism, supra note 25, at 530:
Our need, then, is for counterstories that reveal the lie implicit in the thousands of
majoritarian narratives and sub-narratives according to which we are inferior, according
to which our lowly estate is deserved.... It is no accident that Bell has a tremendous
underground circulation and status in the minority community of color. We know that
his message is true.
356. Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionists,supra note 30, at 2414-15. See also Delgado
& Stefancic, DerrickBell's Chronicle, supra note 215, at 328 ("In Biblical history, storytellers for
oppressed groups told tales of hope and struggle-for example, that of the Promised Land-to
inspire and comfort the community during difficult times. Reality could be better-and, perhaps,
will be.").
357. See supra Part III.C.
358. Bell, Who's Afraid of CriticalRace Theory?, supra note 186, at 906 (discussing critical
race theory in general). As previously intimated, I am especially interested in the role imagination
and utopia play in Delgado's and Bell's work, particularly imagination as productive rather than
just reproductive and utopia as exploration of the possible rather than as escape. See supra notes
91,130,257.

359.

GARDNER,

supra note 125, at 46.
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Gardner's research indicates that mind change most likely occurs when the
following factors operate together: reason, research (supporting data), resonance
(affective support), representational redescriptions (multiple reinforcing
representations), resources and rewards that can be drawn upon, and background
real world events. 3 60 Notice that material factors are relevant to the ideational
change, yet they do not determine the change. Cognitive elements retain some
autonomy. Gardner alludes, for example, to the role of imagination.3 6 1 More
broadly, the possibility of mind change indicates that we 362
need not be simply the
product of our biological, cultural, and historical heritage.
In attempting to conceptualize more precisely the nature of mind change, I
would return to our prior discussion of the hermeneutic relationship between
whole and part. At the moment where we attempt understanding, we bring to
bear the pre-existing "whole" that we are-the various social, cultural, historical,
and cognitive elements of our background and tradition. These interpretive
norms are brought to bear on the "part"-the element that is new. And the
hermeneutic argument is that the whole does not subsume the part, but that each
36 3
informs the other. The part can modify and act on the whole and vice versa.
Think of this action even more precisely by returning to the operation of
metaphor. Metaphor-the "part" newly introduced--displaces a given order-a
prior "whole"-in order to present a new order. 3 64 Now incorporate these
functions of metaphor and application into the operation of narrative. Narrative
does not operate as a form of arms-length logic; it works affectively, disruptively
to challenge existing norms and question their sufficiency. The parable of the
Good Samaritan asks the listener to hold together two contradictory elements,
neighbor and Samaritan. 3 65 Narrative does not simply offer an alternative order;
it undermines the integrity of the order previously held dear. Parable, metaphor,
and narrative can create change.
Yet we must again face the fact of potential resistance. As Delgado and
Stefancic argue, "Divergent new narratives, ones that could jar and change us,
always spark resistance .. . ."366 The fact of resistance is recognized also in the
Bible,3 67 by Bell, 368 and by psychologist Gardner. 3 69 Yet even if conversion is
360. See id. at 15-17. I later return to Gardner's seventh factor, which may negate change:
resistance. See infra note 369.
361. See GARDNER, supra note 125, at 47.
362. Id. at 211-12. This judgment may conflict with Delgado and Stefancic's conclusion that
"our ability to escape the confines of our own preconceptions is quite limited." Delgado &
Stefancic, Images of the Outsider,supra note 50, at 1281. Observe that the debate here concerns
the material nature of our cognitive structures.
363. See WEINSHEIMER, PHILOSOPHICAL HERMENEUTICS, supra note 309, at 80.
364. See RICOEUR, RULE OF METAPHOR, supra note 91, at 22.
365. See supra text accompanying notes 81-83.
366. Delgado & Stefancic, Norms and Narratives, supra note 338, at 1953.
367. Recall the parable of the Sower, Mark 4:3-8. See supra text accompanying note 127.
368. See supra text accompanying notes 272-79.
369. GARDNER, supra note 125, at 18 ("[M]ind changing is unlikely to come about when the
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rarely instantaneous, perhaps narrative's unsettling of prior logic can create a
crack or a wedge that can be opened incrementally over time by new narratives,
just as drops of water can eat into stone. Gardner recognizes the typically
incremental nature of change; 370 Delgado and Stefancic also acknowledge
incremental change as a possibility. 37 1 But even this "optimism" about narrative
may be more suspect, write Delgado and Stefancic, "when applied to evils, like
racism, that are deeply inscribed in the culture." 372 Bell's prognosis is even
more dire: "[R]acism is an integral, permanent, and indestructible component of
3 73
this society."
A paradox seems at work in Bell 374 and also in Delgado and Stefancic. The
structures of racism are perduring, resistance to racial change is strong- yet
they continue to write. In part, their writings, including their narratives,
distinctively offer more material perspectives and strategies-for example,
attention to interest convergence and to local and international labor marketsthat act as alternatives to what they consider failed idealistic models based on
dialogue and discourse. 37 5 And yet these more material arguments are writings,
and writings that attempt to persuade. The paradox is that the structures of
racism are enduring, yet these writings suggest all hope is not lost. The
possibility that a reader will be moved by a parable or a narrative is not
foreclosed; the reception of the metaphorical twist 376 is unpredictable. We do
not know in advance whether the reader will be indifferent, will resist, or will be
reoriented by the disruptive manifestation of the new. At the end of his latest
book, Silent Covenants, Bell quotes Robert Gordon: "'Things seem to change in
history when people... act[] as if... they could change things; and sometimes

resistances are strong, and the other factors do not point strongly in one direction.").
370. See id. at 102 ("We all cherish shortcuts to conveying new ideas, having them
understood forthwith, changing minds dramatically and decisively; and yet it is not possible, in
most cases, to accomplish transmission and acceptance in short order.").
371. See Delgado & Stefancic, Norms and Narratives, supra note 338, at 1933 ("(A]n
unfamiliar narrative invariably generates resistance; despite our best efforts, counterstories are
likely to effect at most small, incremental changes in the listener or reader.").
372. Delgado & Stefancic, Images ofthe Outsider,supra note 50, at 1281.
373. BELL, FACES AT THE BoTroM, supra note 1, at ix. For additional citations to similar
propositions in Bell, see Taylor, Racism as "The Nation's CrucialSin, "supra note 209, at 272-73.
374. See supra notes 247-49 for a discussion of the paradox in Bell's work between his
thesis that racism is permanent and his continued efforts to write and act against it.
375. I also should acknowledge that in recent work arguing for materialist against idealist
models of racial change, Delgado's principal intended audience is other scholars within critical
race theory. See Delgado, Crossroads,supra note 9; Delgado, Two Ways, supra note 41. The
possibility of persuasion may be more available when the reader's views are closer in spectrum to
the author's. Yet the remaining distances may make persuasion difficult here as well. More
generally, if there is at least the possibility of persuading someone of similar but not identical
views, then perhaps this is additional evidence that we are not simply cabined within our own
interpretive worlds but can bridge gaps between ourselves and others.
376. See RICOEUR, RULE OF METAPHOR, supra note 91, at 97-99 (alluding to Monroe C.
Beardsley, The Metaphorical Twist, 22 PHILOSOPHY AND PHENOMENOLOGICAL RESEARCH 293
(1962)).
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they can, though not always in the way they had hoped or intended; but they
never knew they could change them at all until they tried.' 377 For Bell, as for
Delgado and Stefancic, one must do what one can, and one of the available tools
is narrative: narrative that can reorient by disorienting, narrative that can make
manifest something new.

377. BELL, SILENT COVENANTS, supra note 159, at 200 (quoting Robert Gordon, New
Developments in Legal Theory, in THE POLITICS OF LAW 413, 424 (David Kairys ed., 2nd ed.
1990)).
For Delgado and Stefancic's appreciation of the availability and effectiveness of a narrative
twist, I was struck by their quotation of Michel Foucault in an epigraph:
This book first arose out of a passage in Borges, out of the laughter that shattered, as I
read the passage, all the familiar landmarks of my thought-our thought, the thought
that bears the stamp of our age and our geography-breaking up all the ordered surfaces
and all the planes with which we are accustomed to tame the wild profusion of existing
things, and continuing long afterwards to disturb and threaten with collapse our age-old
distinction between the Same and the Other.
Delgado & Stefancic, Why Do We Tell the Same Stories?, supra note 344, at 207 (quoting MICHEL
FOUCAULT, THE ORDER OF THINGS: AN ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES xv (1973)).
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